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THE REAL MARRIAGE PENALTY: HOW
WELFARE LAW DISCOURAGES MARRIAGE
DESPITE PUBLIC POLICY STATEMENTS TO THE
CONTRARY-AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT
IT
Spencer Rand
INTRODUCTION

Couples regularly complain about marriage penalties,' discovering
that the tax consequences of marrying make the cost of marriage
prohibitive. 2 Although attempts were made in the last decade to reduce

Spencer Rand is a clinical associate professor at the Temple
University
Beasley School of Law. Through a community lawyering clinic at the Temple Legal
Aid Office, he represents low-income Philadelphians with disabilities and severe
illnesses in civil legal matters.
Although this article deals largely with marriage penalties outside of the tax
system, a commonly discussed marriage penalty is increased federal income taxes
that married couples must pay. The penalty stems from using a progressive tax
system while at the same time trying to tax all married couples at the same rate.
Though a marriage neutral system is theoretically possible with a flat tax system or
in a system where family members are taxed individually, the federal system does
not work this way. Generally, couples where both spouses work at similar income
levels suffer marriage penalties where those in which one spouse earns substantially
more than the other gets a tax bonus. See Leslie A. Whittington & James Alm,
Marriage Penalty, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TAXATION AND TAX POLICY 251

(Joseph
J. Cordes
et
al.
eds.,
2d
ed.
2005),
available at
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxtopics/encyclopedia/Marriage-Penalty.cfm.
2 Although taxes are disparate for people who marry from single wage earners,
it is not clear that marriage always has a negative impact on income taxes. In fact,
marriage bonuses are quite common. In 1996, 42% of couples had marriage penalties
while 51% received marriage bonuses. See ROBERTON WILLIAMS & DAVID WEINER,
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE: MARRIAGE AND THE FEDERAL

INCOME TAX (June 1997), http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/marriage.pdf.

those penalties for the middle class, 3 the poor were not helped by these
changes. 4 Along with tax penalties, including low-income wage
earners facing severe decreases or becoming entirely ineligible for the
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) when they marry, the most common
penalties reduce or eliminate government benefits upon marriage.
It is paramount for many individuals to retain welfare benefits to
survive economically. Most low-income individuals do not marry
people of greater means, but rather spouses who themselves are often
low-wage workers or close to the poverty line.5 The penalties hinder
both people who want to marry for intrinsic reasons, like love, and
those who want to marry as a practical step to alleviate poverty.
This outcome is ironic because it is directly counter to United
States policies and priorities. In fact, some laws have policy statements
enacted within them that explicitly state Congress's intention to
promote marriage, while those same laws contain programs with
severe marriage penalties. For example, in the Personal Responsibility
3 Since the mid 2000s, the federal income tax rates have been changed so that
if individuals make about the same amount of money, their tax rates should not
increase by marrying. See 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2013) (which includes the tax rates that are
modified, as described in 26 U.S.C. § 1(0(8) (2013), so that increases for spouses
earning similar amounts do not come into effect until the couples earn $148,500
combined). Rev. Proc. 2013-35, 2013-47 I.R.B. 537 (2013).
4 Although the focus of this article is on welfare programs, income tax
marriage penalties and bonuses are the most pronounced and are either problematic
or beneficial to low-income families. In 1996, low-income people paid eight percent
more in income taxes or gained five percent more in a marriage bonus, with bonuses
being more common than penalties, creating a $3 billion net bonus. WILLIAMS &
WEINER, supra note 2, at 15-17, 21 (noting, using 1996 numbers, that each
individual head of household could take a deduction of $5,900 while a couple could
only take a deduction of $6,700. Updating this to 2012, two heads of household
could take an $8,700 deduction while a married couple could only take a $12,200
one). Although the marriage penalties can be due to the earned income tax credit that
will be discussed below, it can also be due to two people not both being able to take
credit for being head of household in their standard deductions. IRS PUBLICATION
501, INT. REV. SERV. tbl. 6, http://www.irs.gov/publications/p50l/ar02.html.
5 Some suggest that many choose not to marry because eligible partners are
poor enough that they are as likely to be taking on more economic issues than
improving their financial condition. See Wendy Sigle-Rushton & Sarah McLanahan,
ForRicher or Poorer:Marriage as an Anti-poverty Strategy in the United States, 57
POPULATION 509 (2002) (suggesting that 46% of unwed fathers marrying unwed
mothers would still be below 200% of the federal poverty line). See Deborah A.
Harris & Domenico Parisi, Looking for "Mr. Right": The Viability of Marriage
Initiatives for African American Women in Rural Settings, 28 SOCIOLOGICAL
SPECTRUM 338 (2008) (suggesting that poor people often have a goal of marrying
but postpone it until they feel financially secure).

and Work Opportunity Act of 1996 (PRWORA), 6 the new Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program made marriage
promotion an explicit goal of the program and Congress explicitly
stated its hope that more marriages would reduce out-of-wedlock
births and thereby reduce welfare rolls.7 Despite these goals, TANF
benefits are greatly reduced when parents move in together. Marriage
promotion policy continues today, through further legislation pushing
marriage promotion8 and through government allocation of about two
billion dollars to marriage promotion programs each year.
Marriage promotion policy does not take into account that when
couples marry, at least in the short term, couples need the combined
total income of both spouses in order to escape poverty. If couples lose
welfare benefits when they marry, but do not lose benefits if they live
apart or live together unmarried, the couples have no choice but to
forgo marriage. Instead of gaining ground, these couples are more
likely to be financially devastated if they marry. This is not a
theoretical problem-it affects people every day. Consider the
following examples from the author's practice:
1. Due to residual side effects of cancer that leave her with
neuropathy so severe she cannot effectively use her hands, Ms. A
receives $721 per month in Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
disability benefits, the federal government's welfare program for
people who have proven to the government that due to a disability,
they cannot work to support themselves. Through this eligibility, she
also receives Medical Assistance, a state administeredfederal health
insuranceprogram to cover her basic healthcare needs. She meets a
parking lot attendant she wants to marry who earns $2,500 per month
and has no health insurance through his job. If she marries him, his

42 U.S.C. §§ 601-19 (1997).
7 A suggested purpose of TANF is to "end the dependence of needy parents on
government benefits by promoting job preparation, work, and marriage." 42 U.S.C. §
601(a)(2) (1997). The law was also to discourage out-of-wedlock pregnancies and
"encourage the formation and maintenance of two-parent families." 42 U.S.C. §
601(a)(2)-(3) (1997).
8 See 42 U.S.C. § 603(a)(2) (2006) (discussing funding to promote marriage
and fatherhood programs). See also 42 U.S.C. § 603(a)(2)(D) (2014) (marriage and
fatherhood funding continues with the 2012 fiscal appropriation being $75,000,000
for fatherhood programs and $75,000,000 for marriage promotion programs). A total
of about two billion dollars is spent each year on marriage promotion programs
under TANF. See infra note 90 and accompanying text.
6

income will be deemed to her. She will lose her SSI benefits,9 leaving
the couple to survive on $2,500 per month before taxes instead of the
$3,221 that they could have lived on ifshe kept her SSI benefits,
cutting their income by more than 20%. Ms. A will lose most of her
Medical Assistance benefits, as her potential spouse's income will be
too high. No matter what income he makes, the couple will lose Ms.
A's SSI benefits and Medical Assistance iftogether the couple has
10
more than $3,000 in assets beyond their home and a few other items.
For Ms. A, who needs medicine and therapy to control her symptoms,
this is an untenable choice and she cannot marry. The couple must
stay separated or ifinstead Ms. A lives with her potential spouse
without marrying, she will either be able to keep her $721 per month
check from SS1 or ifthe government finds she is being supported by
her spouse, she will be allowed to keep two-thirds of it. 1She will also
keep her Medical Assistance. She will not, however, gain the other
benefits of marriage.
2. Ms. B is on Medicare D and needs a very expensive drug to treat
her blood cancer. The drug is covered under Medicare D but would
cost $6,000 per month without Medicare D coverage. Because she
worked before she got cancer, Ms. B qualifies for Social Security of
$800 per month, which makes her income low enough that she
qualifiesfor "Low Income Subsidy, " also called "extra help, " to help
her meet copays.12 Further,as her income is low, she gets help with
the "doughnut hole," a part of the Medicare D program built in as a
disincentive to overspending, under which after the first $2,950 in a
year is spent on prescription drugs by the recipient and the insurer,
the recipient is responsiblefor paying 50% of total drug costs until
9 As will be described in Part IIIof this article, a spouse's income for SSI
reduces the beneficiary's SSI check one dollar for every two after the first $806 per
month or less. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1163(d) (2006).
10As SSI is a welfare program, there are resource caps to benefits. A couple
cannot have more than $3,000 if they own in non-exempt property, an amount that
has not changed in over 25 years. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1205 (2006).
" 20 C.F.R. § 416.1131 (2006).
12 42 C.F.R. § 423.773(b)-(d) (2010) (describing income and asset restrictions
to qualify for "full" or "other" subsidy for Part D). The 2014 guidelines allow a
couple to have $13,750 in resources for a "full" subsidy and $26,960 for "other"
subsidy. Ctr. for Medicare & Medicaid Serv., 2014 Resource and Cost-Sharing
Limits for Low-Income Subsidy (LIS), DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV. (Nov. 6,
2013),
http://www.coeha.com/2014%20LIS%20Asset%2OLevels%2OMemo%20to%20Plan
s.pdf.

total out of pocket costs reach $4,700. Ms. B wants to marry.
However, Ms. B's potential spouse has $30,000 set aside for his
retirement. Because this puts the two $3,000 over the resource limit
for a partialsubsidy and $16,000 over the resource limit for a full
subsidy, Ms. B would not qualify for the full or partial extra help
subsidy, would get no help with her copays, and would have to come
up with several thousanddollars once the doughnut hole hit. Similarly,
if Ms. B's potential spouse received more than $1,200 per month in
income from most sources, they would be over income for these
benefits and therefore ineligible.13 If the two live together without
marrying or if they remain apart,she will continue to get the subsidy.
3. Because his disability began before he was 22 years old, Mr. C
received $800 in Social Security disabled adult child benefits due to
his cerebral palsy.14 He met and married a woman who worked full
time as a nurse's aide, bringing home about $1,500 per month.
Marriage is an immediate bar for receiving disabled adult child
benefits.' 5 Because he married,Mr. C is no longer eligiblefor benefits
regardless of his spouse's income unless his wife is also on Social
Security or SSI.16 Instead of living together on a more survivable
$2,300 per month, the married couple has only $1,500 per month,
which is approximately 125% of thefederalpoverty level.
In each of these situations, poor people lose if they marry, and
retain status quo public benefits if they do not marry. These penalties
do not exist in all cases for all programs. For example, some people
receive marriage bonuses under EITC rules while others receive
penalties. 17 In all cases, people must carefully consider whether
marriage will cause financial harm, which is clearly an unintended
consequence of U.S. policy.
The effect of discontinuing benefits upon marriage is that people
choose not to marry, forfeiting the economic and legal gains they
might achieve in the long term due to the short-term financial
disincentive. " Further, couples are giving up long-term financial
13
14

42 C.F.R. § 423.772 (2011), § 423.773(a)(1) (2010).
20 C.F.R. § 404.350 (1996).
20 C.F.R. § 404.352(b)(4) (2010).

15
16 id.

"7 See infra Part III.
18

But see STEVE HOLT, BROOKINGS INST., THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT

AGE
30:
WHAT
WE
KNOW
(Feb.
2006),
available
at
http://www.brookings.edu/-/media/research/files/reports/2006/2/childrenfamilies%2
AT

benefits, like government benefits to which spouses are entitled later in
life, inheritance benefits, spousal support on separation, and others
because they rely on welfare benefits in the short term.' 9 A practical
policy would eliminate or reduce these penalties and allow for the poor
to take advantage of marriage and maintain their welfare benefits to
raise their standard of living. The policy might even give additional
benefits to those who marry as an incentive to do so.
Perhaps a worse side effect of these penalties is that marriage is
becoming a social contract that only the rich can afford. The rich may
lose some money through marriage penalties, but without significant
impact on their standard of living. The poor lose huge percentages of
their income when they marry. Rich and poor people should have an
equal opportunity to reap the social, legal, and economic benefits of
marriage. It is neither fair, nor what policymakers intended, for the
poor to be unable to marry due to welfare penalties.
Part I of this article looks at how marriage promotion programs fit
within the history of actions taken in the United States to alleviate
poverty. In part, marriage promotion may be suggested because other
attempts to address the roots of poverty have failed to make much
difference, such as work programs. Part II looks at some reasons why
opponents of marriage promotion think that encouraging people to
marry is misguided and stems from racism and disrespect for the poor.
However, there are strong reasons to believe that marriage has
economic, legal, and social benefits. Whether marriage promotion
programs should exist is a separate question from whether the poor
should be able to choose to marry for pragmatic or emotional reasons.
Part III looks at the penalties that exist in welfare programs and
catalogues some of the welfare programs that are much harder for
married people to obtain. These include many public assistance
programs, like SSI and TANF. It also includes some social insurance
programs, like some Social Security and Medicare programs.2" For
many programs, couples are better off living together outside of
marriage than marrying because it allows them to keep or retain
benefits. Part IV suggests some solutions that would make marriage a
0holt/20060209_holt.pdf (studies suggesting that there is not much evidence, at least
in the tax penalty context, that people choose not to marry based on tax
consequences, although there is some suggesting that people already cohabiting
choose not marry due to tax consequences).
'9 See infra Part II.
20 The differences of marriage penalties, between public assistance and
social
insurance programs, are discussed infra Part III.

more viable option. These range from raising the amount of money
married couples can earn or own before they lose benefits, to delaying
deeming of income and resources to married couples to give them a
chance to develop the pragmatic benefits of marriage.
I. WELFARE AS WE Now KNow IT-WHY IT IS ABOUT MARRIAGE
AND NOT JUST ABOUT WORK AND NEED

Marriage would generally not be considered an anti-poverty plan if
welfare supports were stronger, or if work promotion or other
strategies sufficiently alleviated poverty. Unfortunately, as this section
will describe, welfare benefits are low and other strategies designed to
alleviate poverty generally fail. Marriage is a tool that many must
consider to address their needs.
It is not unusual for policymakers to pair decisions on distributing
benefits with measures designed to lessen the need to do so. Often
these decisions are put forward by legislators as a means to alleviate
the causes of poverty before spending taxpayer dollars on welfare
benefits, which seems laudable. 2 1 Disability income programs, like the
SSI program, have been considered in conjunction with programs that
help people with disabilities develop work skills that could help them
return to the workforce, such as programs under the Rehabilitation
Act. 22 The Affordable Care Act (ACA) provided government health
21

One could argue that this was in part the rationale for marriage promotion

during the Reconstruction: Marrying would improve people's morality and lessen the
need for a welfare program for newly-freed slaves by providing financial support
relationships between spouses. Husbands and fathers would be put in a position to
support their families through work and thereby lessen the need to provide welfare.
See Katherine M. Franke, Becoming a Citizen: Reconstruction Era Regulation of
African American Marriages, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 251, 302-303 (1999)
(describing Freedman's Bureau statements that one of the overriding concerns of
their work was to make sure marriages could occur so husbands would relieve the
state of the obligation to support wives and children. Noralee Frankel, Workers,
Wives, and Mothers: Black Women in Mississippi, 1860-1870 (1983) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, George Washington University)). See also Angela OnwuachiWillig, The Return of the Ring: Welfare Reform 's Marriage Cure as the Revival of
Post-Bellum Control, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1647, 1659-61 (2005) (discussing the use of
marriage to legitimate children born during slavery so that the state did not have the
duty to support them and suggesting that PRWORA and later marriage promotion
laws pending in 2005 were designed both for economic purposes and by people who
thought they must civilize blacks).
22 This is sometimes explicit or evident when legislation dealing with welfare
passed in close proximity to the time that legislation is passed attempting to deal
with issues that cause the need for the welfare program. For example, an

insurance coverage for many people, in part by providing expansions
of public health insurance,23 but the ACA also included measures that
would lower health care costs, including requirements that employers
over a certain size provide health insurance for both the rich and poor,
requirements that insurance companies provide preventative care in
order to lessen the eventual cost of health care, 24 incentives for
employers to provide health insurance benefits, 25 and penalties to large
employers that do not provide health insurance benefits, 26 all for the
purpose of the government covering fewer people. Therefore, welfare
programs that are designed to encourage actions by the poor can partly
be seen as programs designed to lessen the need for the government to
provide benefits. 27 One could argue that with poverty programs,
interpretation of the passage of the 1974 Supplemental Security Income program, 29
U.S.C. § 701 (2014), which provides benefits to those who cannot work due to their
disabilities, is that it could not have been passed without first looking at addressing
other issues affecting people with disabilities that prevent them from working and
require the need for welfare benefits. This was done the year before in the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which addressed both discrimination against people with
disabilities in work and other contexts and also expanded vocational rehabilitation.
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. § 701).
23 Individuals who have income up to 133% of the federal poverty line are
covered under medical assistance, a large expansion of eligibility. 42 U.S.C. §
1396a(10)(l)(i)(VIII) (2014). It is beyond the scope of the article to discuss how this
has become an optional expansion of benefits. Clearly, this was only one of the ways
that the Affordable Care Act expanded health care coverage, which included
demanding that private insurance companies provide a full package of health care
benefits. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-6 (2010) (describing what private insurance companies
must provide, which includes a package of benefits designed to provide a full range
of health care at 42 U.S.C. § 18022(a) (2014)).
24 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(1)(I) (2014) (provides that preventative health care is
required in an essential benefits package).
25 See 26 U.S.C. § 45R (2010), for an example of tax credits given to small
employers to ensure that they are more likely to provide health insurance.
26 26 U.S.C. § 4980H (2011).
27 A primary reason this occurs is that United States policy looks at the
problem of need by requiring examination of the individual and the reason why that
individual has need in the first place. It does not have to be so. For example, instead
of looking at people who are blind and asking if they could work or are working to
support themselves, or if they have anyone else who can help them before choosing
to offer help, it could be assumed that blindness causes people to have higher
expenses. Subsidies could be given to all who are blind to supplement whatever
other income they have put together to support themselves, like in social insurance
programs. Similar assumptions could be made about all parents needing more money
to live on when they have children-allowances could be paid to all parents without
looking at whether the parents are poor, are working, or have set up economical

legislation that promotes work or marriage is just another one of these
pairings.
The major way that the U.S. welfare system has designed effective
work incentive programs that have lessened the need for welfare is by
creating social insurance programs. 28 Social insurance programs
provide incentive to people who work with the promise that if they
work long enough, they will later be supported at least at subsistence
levels. The programs are funded by specific taxes taken out of the
wages of the employees, taxes paid by employers on the employees'
behalf, or a combination of the two. Most employers and employees
are required to participate. 29 Some of the best-known United States
social insurance programs are
Social Security, 30 Medicare, 3 1 and
32
Unemployment Compensation.
Although there are other forms of welfare described below, social
insurance programs are generally the most generous of the welfare
programs. Through social insurance programs, people get higher or
lower benefits based on their work history, receiving higher benefits if
they earned higher salaries or worked more years. A Social Security
recipient can receive up to $2,642 per month due to age or disability,
with the average retired worker receiving $1,294 per month and the
average qualifying person with a disability receiving $1,148 per
living arrangements. Many other countries do this. For example, in more than half of
the countries in the European Commission, need is not considered at all in
distribution of family benefits. In many EU and other European Commission
countries, for example, benefits are determined by fitting within a category, without
looking at need. For example, one is eligible for family benefits in Austria, Belgium,
Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy,
Latvia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, Sweden, or
Switzerland.
See
Family
Benefits,
EUROPEAN
COMM'N,
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catld=863&langld=en (last visited Apr. 13,
2015);
MISSOC
Comparative
Tables
Database,
MISSOC,
http://www.missoc.org/INFORMATIONBASE/COMPARATIVETABLES/MISSO
CDATABASE/comparativeTableSearch.jsp (last visited Oct. 18, 2014).
28 It is beyond the scope of this article as to whether social insurance
programs
are welfare benefits or pension benefits. For the purpose of this article, social
insurance programs act like welfare benefits and are thought of as such. For a further
description of this, see Spencer Rand, Creating My Client's Image: Is Case Theory
Value Neutral in Public Benefits Cases?, 28 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 69, 85 (2008).
29 26 U.S.C. § 3102 (2010).
30 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-434.
3'
32

42 U.S.C. § 426 (2004); 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1965).
Unemployment Compensation programs are administered by states and state

law control benefit requirements. However, federal law provides some guidance as to
how Unemployment Compensation laws must look through 42 U.S.C. § 503 (2013).

month.33 These amounts are substantially over the $972.50 per month
federal poverty level,34 and are some of the only programs that pay
enough to support people at subsistence levels or better.
Often, benefits are given only to people who are forced to stop
work due to age or disability (Social Security, Medicare) or
involuntary loss of a job (Unemployment). Other categories of
eligibility that are not work related are not covered. For example,
having a short-term disability, becoming pregnant, or needing to care
for family members is not covered by social insurance programs.
Further, many of these programs require or encourage recipients to
maintain a connection to the workforce. For example, Unemployment
denies benefits to people fired for good cause, so that no matter how
much they or their employers have paid to insure against the
possibility of job loss, they are not covered if they have broken the
inherent social contract to work when they can. Similarly, people
cannot have voluntarily left work without a valid reason. 35 Even after
all this has been demonstrated, people on Unemployment must
continue looking for work and be ready to take on work to get the
benefits. 36 Some programs do not pay benefits unless one has worked
recently, like Unemployment Compensation and Social Security's
if
disability program only insuring people who get disabling conditions
37
condition.
that
developing
of
years
five
within
they have worked
There are some ways that social insurance programs encourage
marriage by providing benefits to workers' families. An example is
SEC.
ADMIN.,
2014
SOCIAL
http://www.ssa.gov/pressoffice/factsheets/colafacts2014.pdf
33

2014).

SOC.

SECURITY

CHANGES,

(last visited Oct. 18,

The federal poverty level is published each year by the Department of Health
and Human Services. In 2014, a family of one in the contiguous United States is
considered in poverty if the family has less than $11,670 annually. That amount
increases by $4,060 per person in the household. Annual Update of the HHS Poverty
Guidelines, 79 Fed. Reg. 3593 (Jan. 22, 2014). It is beyond the scope of this article
to discuss whether the poverty level is appropriate. Many suggest that the level is set
so low that people must have twice the poverty level to meet their expenses. See
PETER EDELMAN, So RICH, SO POOR: WHY IT'S So HARD To END POVERTY IN
AMERICA 26-29 (2012) (discussing how many suggest that people would be better
defined as being below poverty at 200% of the federal poverty level). See also Rand,
supra note 28, at 92.
35 To qualify for unemployment insurance, a person generally must have not
been fired for misconduct or have left their job voluntarily.
36 To qualify for unemployment, you have to be able and available to work,
meaning that you are looking for work and capable of performing work.
3' 42 U.S.C. § 423(c)(1)(B) (2004).
3'

Social Security, which provides spousal and widow's disability and
retirement benefits that unmarried people with similar relationships to
workers cannot share. 38 However, for the most part, social insurance
programs are about work. Although some social insurance programs
include marriage penalties, as described in Part III, these programs do
not generally consider among their policies how people should live
their lives other than by encouraging work.
However, there are people who have not or cannot work who
therefore do not qualify for social insurance programs or who stop
working for reasons other than those that social insurance programs
anticipate. There are public assistance programs that can help to
support people in these situations. Public assistance programs are for
individuals without a substantial work history or for those who leave
work for reasons that the United States has not chosen to cover under
its social insurance programs. The programs cover a variety of
contingencies, like being parents who cannot support their children or
being one of those children; being older and presumably aging out of
the workforce; having a disability that would qualify for social
insurance but not having worked enough to qualify for those benefits;
or just not having a source of income. Mostly, the programs are very
low-payment programs that often provide much less than subsistence
level income to the people that the programs are intended to serve. The
old, the blind, and the very disabled 39 who have not worked enough to
qualify for social insurance through Social Security qualify for SS1"a program that pays people $721 per month 41 (74% of the federal
38

42 U.S.C. §

402(b)-(f). Social Security is one of the first programs to be

extended to gay spouses as well. See Soc. SEC. ADMIN., PROGRAM OPERATIONS
MANUAL
SYSTEM,
GN
00210
(June
2014),
https://secure.ssa.gov/apps 10/poms.nsf/Inx/0200210000.
39 People with disabilities do not qualify for SSI (or Social Security disability,
for that matter) unless they can show that their disabilities are so severe that the
disability will last a year and will strongly impair work-related functionality. 20
C.F.R. §§ 416.920, 404.1520 (2012). One might think that a disability that raises a
person's expenses, such as a blind person who can work and has extra expenses to
live or a incontinent person who needs to buy diapers would qualify for some income
support just based on having a disability. They do not.
40 42 U.S.C. § 1381
(1972).
41

See

SOC.

SEC.

ADMIN.,

SSI

FEDERAL

PAYMENT

AMOUNTS,

http://www.ssa.gov/oact/cola/SSlamts.html (last visited Oct. 23, 2014), for payment
amounts. Some states supplement this amount. States which have their supplements
administered by the federal government all pay less than $100 extra per month. SoC.
SEC. ADMIN., Sl 01415.001 STATE SUPPLEMENTARY PROGRAMS (Aug. 6, 2012),

https://secure.ssa.gov/appslO/poms.nsf/lnx/0501415001.

For a list of which states

poverty level of $972.50). 4 2 TANF, the public assistance program for

parents and their children, historically pays much less than SSI. The
median TANF grant for a family of three is $426 per month, 43 less
than 25% of the federal poverty level for a family of three, which is
$1,649.16 per month. 44 These amounts are not growing-every state
45
provides less than 50% of the federal poverty line in TANF benefits.

People who are not working and do not fit into any of these categories
of need get little and in some cases no assistance. 46 As the political
discussion exists today, it is unlikely4 7that more money is going to be
distributed to the poor any time soon.
pay

supplements,

SECURITY

see

Soc. SEC.

INCOME

ADMIN.,
SSI

UNDERSTANDING

SUPPLEMENTAL

BENEFITS-2014

EDITION,

http://www.socialsecurity.gov/ssi/text-benefits-ussi.htm.
42 Annual Update of the HHS Poverty Guidelines, 79 Fed. Reg.
3,593 (Jan. 22,
2014).
43 The average maximum state benefit for a family of 3 was $426 per month as
of 2010. STAFF OF THE H. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 112TH CONG., 2012 GREEN
BOOK: TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES (TANF): WELFARE-TO-

WORK
REVISITED
tbl.
7-23
(2012),
http://greenbook.waysandmeans.house.gov/sites/greenbook.waysandmeans.house.go
v/files/2012/documents/Table%207-23%20RM%20TANF.pdf; STAFF OF THE H.
COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 112TH CONG., 2012 GREEN BOOK: TEMPORARY
ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES (TANF): WELFARE-TO-WORK REVISITED tbl. 7-25

(2012),
http://greenbook.waysandmeans.house.gov/sites/greenbook.waysandmeans.house.go
v/files/2012/documents/Table%207-25%20RM%20TANF.pdf. If you include SNAP
benefits (formerly called food stamps), that amount increases to $868, which is still
about half of the federal poverty level.
44 78 Fed. Reg. 5,182, 5,123 (Jan. 24, 2013).
45 IKE FLOYD & LIZ SCHOTT, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES,
TANF

CASH BENEFITS CONTINUED TO LOSE VALUE IN 2013 (Oct. 21, 2013),
http://www.cbpp.org/files/10-21 -13tanf.pdf.
46 As of 2011 , only 30 states had General Assistance programs, 12 of which
required adults seeking help to also have disabilities. See LIZ SCHOTT & CLARE CHO,
CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, GENERAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS: SAFETY

NET
WEAKENING
DESPITE INCREASED
NEED
1 (Dec.
19,
2011),
http://www.cbpp.org/files/10-26-1 lpov.pdf. The number of states providing General
Assistance has decreased by at least one, as Pennsylvania ended its program as of
August 2012.
47 One of the reasons that funding for these programs remains so low is that
many public assistance programs are block grants administered by the state and are
kept low by state legislators to keep budgets balanced. For example, in Pennsylvania,
TANF and General Assistance levels have not been increased since 1989. There has
been a movement by some to provide much higher levels of assistance to people with
extraordinary needs, like longtime homeless people, believing that high levels of
support allow people to rebuild their lives and can be cheaper in the long term due to

Because it has been relatively successful with social insurance
programs, one would think that social engineering by encouraging or
requiring people to work on public assistance would be common and
might be sufficient. Although work is regularly pushed, however, work
programs and incentives for these people have generally failed. Along
with job training, these programs have both carrot-and-stick job
incentives built into their administration. TANF is largely an example
of a program utilizing the stick method with both state grantees and
recipients. Federal block grants require states to demonstrate that they
have rules established that require 50% of all families and 90% of two
parent families to have a family member working at least 30 hours per
week.48 States have corresponding requirements for their recipients
demanding that the recipient work,4 9 with heavy sanctions for people
who do not comply with their rules. 50 SS, uses more of a carrot
approach, allowing recipients who find work on their own to remain
on SSI with grants reduced by about one dollar for every two dollars
earned, encouraging individuals to obtain work with the hope that aid
can be reduced or eliminated.51
the large expenses of hospitalization and incarceration for those who cannot make it
with little or no money. For a description of one of these programs, see Malcolm
Gladwell, Million-DollarMurray: Why Problems Like Homelessness May Be Easier
To Solve Than To Manage, reprinted in MALCOLM GLADWELL, WHAT THE DOG
SAW AND OTHER ADVENTURES 177, 187-192 (2009).
48 42 U.S.C. § 607 (2002).
49 See STAFF OF THE H. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 112TH CONG.,
2011
GREEN BOOK: TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES (TANF): A PRIMER
ON TANF FINANCING AND
FEDERAL REQUIREMENTS
tbl. A-2 (2011),
http://greenbook.waysandmeans.house.gov/sites/greenbook.waysandmeans.house.go
v/files/201 1/images/RL32748%20v2_gb.pdf (describing rules for families to work as
many as 55 hours per week to qualify for benefits if the family is a two-parent
family getting childcare). For an example from Pennsylvania, see Pennsylvania's
"Road To Economic Self-Sufficiency Through Employment And Training (RESET)
Program" describing implementation of these rules. 55 PA. CODE § 165.31 (2002).
See PA DEPT. OF PUBLIC WELFARE, CASH ASSISTANCE HANDBOOK § 135.2,
http://services.dpw.state.pa.us/oimpolicymanuals/manuals/bop/ca/index.htm
(last
visited Oct. 25, 2014).
50 In Pennsylvania, a person who fails to comply with work requirements is
denied assistance for 30 days or until they comply for the first occurrence, 60 or until
they comply for the second occurrence, and permanently for the third. If the person
has been receiving TANF for more than 24 months, not only will the person's TANF
benefits be cut off, their entire family's benefits will be cut off. 55 PA. CODE §
165.61(b) (2002).
5' 20 C.F.R. § 416.1112 (2004). For TANF, there is also a work incentive
program that counts money at approximately one-third of earnings. In Pennsylvania,
there is a 50% earned income disregard for people on TANF. 55 PA. CODE § 183.94

However, although welfare-to-work programs succeed to some
extent in reducing welfare rolls, they do little to reduce poverty.52 Jobs
for former welfare recipients are often low-wage jobs that leave former
recipients below the poverty line. 53 Women may fare worse than men,
as they are already disproportionately represented in low-wage jobs
and are often pushed into other low-wage jobs through work
programs. 54 Even those fortunate enough to obtain minimum wage
jobs remain impoverished. 5 As pointed out by President Obama in his
(2014). However, as TANF grants are so low, it is difficult to say whether these
programs provide much incentive, as any work that is substantial would likely cancel
out any TANF grant.
52 SHARON PARROTT, WELFARE RECIPIENTS WHO FIND JOBS: WHAT
Do WE
KNOW ABOUT THEIR EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS?, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY
PRIORITIES (1998), http://www.cbpp.org/archiveSite/1 1-16-98wel.pdf (last visited

Oct. 25, 2014) (suggesting that recipients and former recipients likely earn between
$2,000 and $2,700 per quarter and that most get no benefits, including no sick leave,
vacation, or health insurance). This interpretation is confirmed by the Congressional
Research Service, suggesting work requirements lowered welfare rolls and got more
people jobs but did not raise incomes. Shannon Bopp & Gene Falk, Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF): Welfare To Work Revisited, CONG.
2012),
2,
(Oct.
8
SERV.
RESEARCH
http://greenbook.waysandmeans.house.gov/sites/greenbook.waysandmeans.house.go
v/files/2012/documents/R42767_gb.pdf.
53 See Chi-Fang Wu, Maria Cancian & Daniel R. Meyer, Standing Still or
Moving Up: Evidencefrom Wisconsin on the Long-Term Employment and Earnings
of TANF Participants, 32 SOC. WORK RESEARCH 90, 91-97 (2008). The article
includes a good summary of research data on employment and earnings of welfare to
work programs for mothers receiving TANF, and then reports a study of 14,150
women in a Wisconsin program over six years, concluding that most of the women
did not end up with jobs with substantial earnings. Although 22% had earnings over
$15,000 per year, only 13% had jobs averaging that much. See also Mickey Hepner
& W. Robert Reed, The Effect of Welfare on Work and Marriage:A View from the
States, 24 CATO J. 349 (2004), arguing that when welfare programs are considered in
combination, single working mothers gain little from increasing their income due to
disregards of income at lower earnings levels. But see.Daniel T. Lichter & Martha L.
Crowley, Welfare Reform and Child Poverty: Effects of Maternal Employment,
Marriage, and Cohabitation, 33 Soc. SCI. RESEARCH 385 (2004), suggesting that
work was more effective than marriage or cohabitation in raising children out of
poverty and attributing half of the rise to women working.
54 See Sara Lichenwalther, Gender Poverty Disparity In US Cities: Evidence
ExoneratingFemale-HeadedFamilies, 32 J. OF SOCIOLOGY & SOCIAL WELFARE 75
(2005)5 See Maria Cancian et al., UNIV. OF WISCONSIN-MADISON INST. FOR
Income and Program Participationamong Early TANF
Recipients: The Evidencefrom New Jersey, Washington, and Wisconsin, 22 FOCUS 2
(2003) (comparing TANF welfare to work outcomes in Wisconsin, New Jersey, and
Washington and concluding that all average less than $10,000 per year in earnings
RESEARCH ON POVERTY,

2013 State of the Union address, an individual working full time at
minimum wage earns $14,500 per year, which is below the federal
poverty line for a family of three. 56 Even if the minimum wage were
increased to $10.10 per hour, as suggested in President Obama's 2014
State of the Union Address, 57 a family of three could hardly rise above
the poverty level. Further, minimum wage jobs also leave people
without necessary benefits, like health insurance. Fewer than 26% of
people working jobs that pay less than $8.24 per hour have access to
58
health insurance from work-and less than 13% take that insurance.
Though there are exceptions,
work has not been a good overall
60
strategy 59 to reduce poverty.
II. WHY MARRIAGE MIGHT HELP ALLEVIATE POVERTY
Because job creation has not been effective in addressing poverty,
some have put forward marriage-promotion as a method to do so,
particularly among people receiving public assistance. 6 1 Although

while about 50% of people in New Jersey and Wisconsin and 41% of people in
Washington remain below the poverty level, with 14-20% remaining at less than half
the poverty level).
56 Barack Obama, President of the United States, State of
the Union Address
(2013),
(transcript
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2013/02/12/remarks-president-state-union-address).
This figure can be
calculated by multiplying the federal minimum wage of $7.25 per hour by 40 hours
per week and 50 weeks per year. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1)(C) (2007).
57 Barack Obama, President of the United States, State of the Union Address
(2014),
(transcript
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2014/01/28/president-barack-obamas-state-union-address).
58
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2009), http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/benefits/2009/ebblOO44.pdf.
59 The number of people living below the federal poverty line has actually
decreased since 1996, from 13.7% to 15% in 2012. The number of female-headed
households in poverty has remained relatively constant and in fact has increased
slightly since 1996, from 35.8% to 33.9% in 2012. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
HISTORICAL POVERTY TABLES-PEOPLE, TABLE 2. POVERTY STATUS, BY FAMILY
RELATIONSHIP,

RACE,

AND

HISPANIC

ORIGIN,

https://www.census.gov/hhes/www/poverty/data/historical/people.html (last visited
Oct. 23, 2014).
60 Left out of this discussion is the push by some for
improving our education
system toward getting people out of poverty. As improving education is tied to
getting people better jobs, the points that have been made are similar.
61 For a description of particular marriage promotion programs that have been
tried, see THEODORA OOMS, STACEY BOUCHET & MARY PARKE, CTR. FOR LAW &

motivation for promoting marriage that is expressed or implied in
recent legislation may not be shared by all Americans, policymakers
are correct that marriage could be a helpful way to reduce the level of
poverty.
A. MarriagePromotion
The rhetoric around marriage promotion programs has escalated,
as has government investment in those programs. 62 The fight about
whether marriage promotion policies should be funded has become
separate from the issue of whether marriage can help alleviate
poverty-which it may.
In large part, marriage promotion advocates have been successful
in enacting laws explicitly pairing marriage with welfare benefits. In
the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996
(PRWORA), 63 welfare benefits for parents with children were
considered and enacted, along with programs providing job training
and programs encouraging marriage. PRWORA, which included the
new TANF program and stated that it was designed to provide
monetary assistance for children to be cared for in their own or in
relatives' homes, 64 paired this assistance with programs designed to
"end the dependence of needy parents on government benefits by
promoting job preparation, work, and marriage." Some of the
motivation for promoting marriage included reducing "out-ofwedlock" pregnancies and promoting two parent families. 66 Marriage
promotion was seen as an economic tool to ensure that two parents

SOCIAL POLICY, BEYOND MARRIAGE LICENSES: EFFORTS IN STATES TO STRENGTHEN
MARRIAGE AND TwO-PARENT FAMILIES (Apr. 2004).
62 See Bryce Covert, Nearly A Billion Dollars Spent On Marriage Promotion

Programs Have Achieved Next to Nothing, THINKPROGRESS (Feb. 11, 2014, 11:33
http://thinkprogress.org/economy/2014/02/11/327581 1/marriage-promotionAM),
money/. But see Rachel Sheffield, National Marriage Week: Fight Poverty by
Strengthening

Marriage,

DAILY

SIGNAL,

Feb.

12,

http://dailysignal.com/2014/02/12/national-marriage-week-fight-povertystrengthening-marriage.
63 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-19 (2014).
64 42 U.S.C. § 601(a)(1) (1997).
65 42 U.S.C. § 601(a)(2) (1997).
66 42 U.S.C. § 601(a)(3)(4) (1997).

2014,

would be in the home to improve the chances that children would not
be poor and would not need TANF.67
Pairing marriage with welfare, however, is different from asking
people to work or to take other steps to alleviate poverty and often
makes the poor and their advocates bristle for many reasons. For some,
marriage promotion is anathema as it was put forward at a time when
the United States was pushing morality legislation to promote
marriage generally. The most prominent recent version of policy
promoting marriage was the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA).68
Passed in the same year by the same Congress as the PRWORA,
DOMA is a good example of the moral values legislation that tied the
receipt of government benefits (among other things) to a willingness to
conform to a traditional version of marriage. 69 To the extent that a
marriage promotion in TANF supported heterosexual marriage, some
questioned whether PRWORA was developed for economic reasons or
to engineer poor families to resemble those of the majority of
lawmakers in 1996.
Further, some of the concern that marriage promotion was just
pushing majority morals on the poor is founded on its resemblance and
possible connection to historical programs from Reconstruction. The
Freedman's Bureau pushed a welfare policy for former slaves that
encouraged them to marry as almost a magical panacea to import them
into "civilized" life. Former slaves, prevented from marrying prior to
emancipation, were considered to have low moral standards for not
having married. It was felt that these moral failings led to poverty.7 °
To quote the Freedman's Bureau, "Marital relations are invaluable as a
For a description of some early marriage promotion programs, see Judith E.
Koons, Motherhood, Marriage, and Morality: The Pro-MarriageMoral Discourse
ofAmerican Welfare Policy, 19 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 10-11 (2004).
68 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996).
69 Although beyond the scope of this article, the Defense of Marriage Act
67

among other things made it so that gay married couples could not obtain Social
Security benefits based on each other's records, a policy that continued until the
Supreme Court allowed for recognition of these marriages. United States v. Windsor,
133 S.Ct. 2675 (2013).
70 See Franke, supra note 21 (arguing that some blacks were denied
the right to
marry because marriage implied that blacks had the rights of free citizens. It also
discusses that during slavery, marriage would be impractical for slave owners from a
business sense as marriage would make it more likely that families would have to be
kept intact and family members would be less of a tradable commodity. When
slavery was no longer possible, intact families were no longer banned but marriage
was thought to be important for moral and economic reasons, leading to marriage
promotion).

means of promoting industry. Morality encourages industry and
prosperity. Immorality in the sexual relations produces idleness,
intemperance, and apathy."' 71 To the extent that welfare recipients
today are caricatured as "welfare queens," an assumption that can be
translated today as poor blacks seeking to live off the system,72 or to
the extent that welfare recipients are thought of as uncivilized or
undisciplined people needing marriage to temper them, marriage
promotion can be seen as an unwelcome personal attack. 73 Further, it
is convenient to blame poor people, who are often pictured as minority
women, for moral failings (such as unwed teen pregnancy) leading to
it less likely that
poverty. This assumption of moral failure makes
74
others will feel compelled to address poverty.
In addition to the implied-morals insult of these marriage
promotion initiatives, there are several other reasons marriage
promotion is disliked. First, blaming the poor for their plight ignores
the United States economic system which lacks opportunity for
upward financial mobility. Focusing policy on marriage promotion
suggests that the poor have a realistic opportunity (through marriage or
other actions) to escape poverty. This assumption may itself be flawed.
Although there are certainly individual cases where people have
escaped poverty, these are not generalizable cases and indeed there are
very few steps individuals can take that have been proven effective to
improve economic circumstances. 75 According to studies, 70% of
people who start out in the bottom earnings quintile remain in the
71 See Onwuachi-Willig, supra note 21, at 1661. See also Rachel Cohen, Two

Steps Forward,One Step Back: Evaluatingthe Healthy MarriageInitiative in Light
of America's Welfare History, 17 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 145 (2010)
(looking at the issue as a marginalization of black men during Reconstruction and
afterwards by providing them with less welfare and demanding that they work to
support families).
72 For a description of Ronald Reagan's famous "welfare queen" analogy that
took an actual poor black woman cheating on the system and made her the face of all
people on welfare, see Michele Estrin Gilman, Symposium. Gender Matters: Women,
Social Policy, And The 2012 Election: The Return Of The Welfare Queen, 22 AM.
U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 247, 259-260 (2014).
73 For a description of this opinion that the 1996 welfare reform laws were
passed because legislators clearly felt that welfare recipients were primarily lazy
black women, see A. Mechele Dickerson, America's Uneasy Relationship With the
Working Poor, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 17, 27-32 (1999).
74 See Parvin R. Huda, Singled out: A Critique of Single Motherhood In
Welfare Discourse, 7 WM. & MARY J. OF WOMEN & L. 341 (2001) (suggesting that
welfare reform was about demonizing poor single mothers).
75 In fact Koons, supra note 67, suggests that marriage promotion is designed
to keep women in low-income subservient roles.

bottom-two income quintiles. 76 An individual's race may be most
predictive of his or her chance to escape poverty. 7 Education seems to
give only a small boost, and for the most part helps only those who
obtain a four-year college degree. 78 There is little (including
employment as discussed in Part I of this article) that has been proven
to help a person change economic status. Asking the poor
to marry or
79
questionable.
is
poverty
alleviate
to
steps
to take other
Second, it does not necessarily follow logically that because
married people are often richer than poorer people, marrying itself will
make poorer people richer as a matter of course. 80 It may be instead
that richer people marry more often because they can afford to do so
while the poor cannot, meaning that having money is a prerequisite to
marrying, not that marrying brings money. 81 In fact, people may wait
until they are in a better economic circumstance to marry, making
82
marriage a sign of better economic standing and not the cause of it.
76 SUSAN K. URAHN, PEW CHARITABLE TRUST, EcoMoMic MOBILITY PROJECT,
PURSUING THE AMERICAN DREAM: ECONOMIC MOBILITY ACROSS GENERATIONS 6
(July
2012),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/legacy/uploadedfiles/pcsassets/2012/PursuingA
mericanDreampdf.pdf. See also Leila Bengali & Mary Daly, U.S. Economic
Mobility: The Dream and the Data,Fed. Reserve Bank of S.F. Economic Letter, no.
2013-06
(Mar.
4,
2013),
http://www.frbsf.org/economicresearch/publications/economic-letter/2013/february/us-economic-mobility-dreamdata/.
77 URAHN, supra note 76, at 18-22.
78 Id. at 23-26. See also Bengali & Daly, supra note 76 (the authors note the
dramatic change in economic status when the poor get college degrees but note that
only seven percent of the poor do so).
79 Economic segregation tends to preclude economic mobility. For example, a
large middle class in areas in which the poor reside seems to allow for larger
economic mobility for all. See BEN OLINSKY & SASHA POST, CTR. FOR AM.
PROGRESS, MIDDLE-OUT MOBILITY: REGIONS WITH LARGER MIDDLE CLASSES (Sept.
4,
2013),
http://cdn.americanprogress.org/wpcontent/uploads/2013/08/MiddleOutMobility.pdf. Though where one lives is not as
immutable as race, it is unlikely the poor can do anything to increase the middle
class in their region other than to move places where they likely cannot afford
housing where the middle class is larger.
80 See Daniel T. Lichter, Deborah Roempke Graefe & J. Brian Bowen, Is
Marriage a Panacea? Union Formation Among Economically Disadvantaged
Unwed Mothers, 50 SOCIAL PROBLEMS 60, 74 (2003) (suggesting that women who
marry and stay married have a better chance of escaping poverty, while those who
marry and divorce may be worse off).
81 See Harris & Parisi, supra note 5.
82 See Katrina Running & Louise Marie Roth, To Wed Or To Work? Assessing
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177, 193 (2013)

Alternatively, it may be that something else, such as education or
maturation, correlates with more money and ability to marry. If it is
true that richer people marry, poor people marrying may just mean
more poor married people. It is also not necessarily true that if
marriage promotion programs make it so fewer children are born into
poverty-stricken families that those children will not become poor as
adults. In fact, studies show that children born 83
to married parents are
not necessarily protected from poverty as adults.
Third, assuming that marriage itself provides escape from poverty,
marriage promotion programs would likely not be necessary to show
poor people that marrying would improve their economic status. In the
marriage penalty area, the Social Security Administration understands
this and has written about poor people not marrying particularly to
avoid penalties.8 4 It is unlikely that if marriage were the key to ending
poverty, poor people would need a rocket scientist or a social worker
to tell them so.
Fourth, no one likes being told what to do. Studies suggest that
marriage promotion programs fail because people do not want to get
married for a variety of legitimate reasons. For example, one study
shows that women find marriage will limit their independence, be

(suggesting that black women in particular are more likely to wait until they are
more financially secure to marry).
83 See Jens Ludwig & Susan Mayer, "Culture" and the Intergenerational
Transmission of Poverty: The Prevention Paradox, 16 FUTURE OF CHILDREN 175
(2006) (which suggests that poor adults come from both poor and non-poor families
and that addressing poverty for some children does not address poverty in the next
generation). But see Paul R. Amato & Rebecca A. Maynard, DecreasingNonmarital
Births and StrengtheningMarriageto Reduce Poverty, 17 FUTURE OF CHILDREN 117
(2007) (suggesting that if poor children were wealthier and healthier including by
decreasing nonmarital births, poverty would be reduced by their estimates up to
29%); Adam Thomas & Isabel Sawhill, ForLove and Money? The Impact of Family
Structure on Family Income, 15 FUTURE OF CHILDREN 57 (2005) (showing through
simulation that marriages between low income couples produce fewer children in
poverty and suggesting that at least coupling would reduce poverty).
84 In an amazingly troubling study, authors working with the Social
Security
Administration's Office of Policy found that (1) couples may not always report
whether they are married; (2) non-married cohabiting SSI recipients are more likely
to live above the poverty level while married ones are more likely to live below it;
and (3) non-married cohabiting SSI recipients who try to work are more likely to be
in poverty than married couples who do so. Melissa Koenig & Kalman Rupp, SSI
Recipients in Households and Families with Multiple Recipients: Prevalence and
Poverty Outcomes, 65 SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN 14 (2003/2004), available at
http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v65n2/v65n2p14.pdf.

unlikely to increase their financial stability, and may tie them to people
with whom they do not want to be connected8 5
Fifth, focusing welfare policy on marriage diverts attention from
other strategies that might be used to alleviate poverty. 86 It does not
address problems such as there not being enough well-paying jobs for
men or women to make marriage more economically helpful. It also
does little to improve the economic system or other circumstances
for
88
all, including those who cannot or do not want to marry.
Finally, it is clear that the programs instituted have largely failed to
increase the numbers of poor people marrying or leaving welfare. In
practice, the programs are expensive and generally ineffective. 89 In
2012, for example, federal and state governments spent over two
billion dollars on marriage promotion programs, while at the same
time spending only nine billion dollars more on providing actual aid
and services to people in need. This means that about 18% of money
that is spent on addressing need is not going to meet needs directly, but
instead on a speculative hope that marriage will decrease the need. 90
This might not be problematic to all if there was any evidence that the
85 Marcella Gemelli, Understanding the Complexity of Attitudes of LowIncome Single Mothers Toward Work and Family in the Age of Welfare Reform, 25
GEND. ISSUES 101 (2008).

See EDELMAN, supra note 34, at 4-5 (implying using marriage penalties as
an excuse for failed welfare policy is a copout. Edelman is reacting to comments by
Robert Rector of the Heritage Foundation in a congressional committee hearing
where he stated that many welfare programs have anti-marriage (and anti-work)
effects, that "[t]he single, strongest cause of poverty in the United States today is the
lack of marriage," and he continues by dividing the United States into the rich caste
of married people with college degrees and the poor caste of unmarried people with
86

high school degrees. See Duplication And Inefficiencies In FederalSocial Welfare
Programs: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Regulatory Affairs, 112th Cong. 1
(2011).
87 See Julia Fisher, Marriage Promotion Policies and the Working
Poor, A
Match Made in Heaven?, 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 475, 492 (2005).
88 See Jane Waldfogel, The Role of Family Policies in Anti-Poverty Policy, 26
Focus 50, 54 (2009) http://www.irp.wisc.edu/publications/focus/pdfs/foc262i.pdf.
89

See JUDITH A. LEVINE, AIN'T NO TRUST: How BOSSES, BOYFRIENDS, AND

BUREAUCRATS FAIL Low-INCOME MOTHERS AND WHY IT MATTERS 157-58 (2013)

(looking at reasons why women do not trust men in their life and why they choose to
marry them, and citing studies suggesting that numbers of marriages have not
increased since welfare reform) (citations omitted).
90 See supra Part I. The Office of Family Assistance of the Department of
Health and Human Services published statistics discussed in that section that about
$2 billion was spent on reducing out of wedlock pregnancies. TANF FINANCIAL
DATA-FY
2012,
DEP'T
OF
HEALTH
&
HUMAN
SERV.,
http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/ofa/resource/tanf-financial-data-fy-2012.

marriage promotion programs were actually lowering the number of
unmarried people in the country or lowering the number of people in
poverty. Unfortunately, there is no evidence to show any impact in
these outcomes. Despite marriage promotion and fatherhood programs
written directly into the TANF program since 1996, 91 the rates of
marriage among poor people is not increasing and may be decreasing.
In 2013, just under 50% of all people were married and living with a
spouse. 92 For low-income people, the numbers are significantly lower:
About 32% of women with income of less than $5,000 are married and
living with a spouse, while about 41% of women with income between
$5,000 and $14,999 do so, with the statistics being even lower for
men. 93 When these numbers are compared to studies done prior to the
marriage promotion funding in the 2005 Deficit Reduction Act, it is
94
clear that the numbers are not improving and may be getting worse.
In 2003, 30.5% of people with incomes below $10,000 were married
and 46% of people with incomes between $10,000 and $14,999 were
married. 95 Either poor people are not getting the message, or
something is getting in the way of people choosing to marry.
Not only are fewer people marrying, but marriage has not
necessarily proven to be an effective way to get off of welfare. Only
between two and nine percent of people leaving welfare do so due to
getting married.96 Although this might seem like a substantial number,
"' See 42 U.S.C. § 603(a)(2) (2006).
92
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93 Id.
94 See WENDY

D. MANNING ET AL., HEALTHY MARRIAGE INITIATIVE SPENDING
AND U. S. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE RATES, A STATE-LEVEL ANALYSIS,
http://www.bgsu.edu/content/dam/BGSU/college-of-arts-andsciences/NCFMR/documents/FP/FP-14-02_HMIInitiative.pdf. See also Marianne P.
Bitler et al., The Impact of Welfare Reform on Marriageand Divorce, (Fed. Reserve
Bank of Atlanta, Working Paper No. 2002-9, 2002) (suggesting that neither
marriages nor divorces increased with welfare reform).
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2003
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FAMILIES
https://www.census.gov/prod/2004pubs/p20-553.pdf. Table 6 interprets results of the
U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, Annual Social and Economic
Supplement, 2003, and demonstrates that 117,172,000 out of 225,257,000 people
over 15, or about 52% of people, were married and living with their spouses in 2003.
The number of people married by income level is described in Table 2 and the
percentages above are math calculations based on those tables.
96 For an explanation of these rules, see GENE FALK & JILL TAUBER,
CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RL31170, WELFARE REFORM: TANF PROVISIONS RELATED TO
AMERICAN

it is the same as the number of people leaving welfare because they
find that they feel hassled by the welfare system, and the number is
well below those leaving because they do not want to be on welfare or
they cannot figure out or do not manage to comply with
redetermination requirements. 97 As of 2011, despite marriage
promotion, and the two-parent family policy, only 5.3% of TANF
grants go to two-parent98families, a number that has not significantly
changed over the years.
B. The Benefits Of Marriage
With marriage promotion programs failing and with all of the
reasons to oppose them as disrespectful and illogical, there still may be
good reason for the U.S. to support marriage among all economic
classes. There are economic, legal, and social reasons why marriage
benefits individuals and society, were marriage penalties not as
onerous.
1. Economic Benefits
One of the most prominent economists to have considered whether
marriage can be an economic boon is Gary Becker, in his Treatise on
the Family.99 Becker considers marriage to have huge economic value.
In part, Becker bases this idea on each spouse's ability to specialize in
certain activities for the benefit of the family unit.10 His vision of
marriage is as a heterosexual union and when he talks of
specialization, he divides tasks in part based on biological differences

MARRIAGE AND TwO-PARENT FAMILIES 17 (2001) (citing CHRISTINE DEVERE,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30882, WELFARE REFORM RESEARCH: WHAT Do WE
KNOW ABOUT THOSE WHO LEAVE WELFARE? 12 (2001)).
97 DEVERE, supra note 96, at
12.
98 STAFF OF THE H. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, 112TH CONG.,
2012 GREEN
BOOK:
WORK

TEMPORARY ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES (TANF): WELFARE-TOREVISITED
tbl.
7-10
(2012),

http://greenbook.waysandmeans.house.gov/sites/greenbook.waysandmeans.house.go
v/files/2012/documents/Table%207-1 0%20TANF.pdf.
99 GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY (enlarged ed., 1993). This
work might not have focused as much on heterosexual coupling had it been written a
few decades later. Becker clearly feels that differences between men and women
complement each other economically, in part due to biological childbearing roles and
in part due to difference assumed from stereotypical male/female roles.
'oo Id. at 39, 62.

between men and women.' 0 ' He sees women specializing in household
chores, particularly during childbearing and childrearing years.
Although he attributes some of this to the time and energy many
women spend raising a family,' 1 2 he attributes some to earnings
discrepancies between men and women, suggesting that if men earn
it is more efficient for men to be the ones in the
more than women,
10 3
workforce.

Alongside specialization, Becker also looks at how altruism works
04
in married families to increase the couple's economic position.'
Becker suggests that it is not necessarily selflessness that leads to this
altruism but that by working together to assist each other, married
the entire family income, making life better for all of the
couples raise
5
family.

10

Becker is not alone in theorizing that there can be large economic
benefits from marriage. Linda J. Waite and Maggie Gallagher suggest
many economic gains. 106 Along with agreeing with Becker that
07
specialization in marriage is a large advantage to married couples,'
Waite and Gallagher believe that being married "until death do us
part" is quite significant. They consider this a type of "marriage
insurance," making it so that each person helps the other in bad

Id. at 39.
Id. at 64.
103 Id. at 41. Becker points out that in 1977, men worked more hours, earned

101

102

more per hour, and worked more weeks than women. These statistics likely hold true
today. In 2012, women earned 81% of what men did on a weekly basis and 77 per
cent of what they did on an annual basis. See ARIANE HEGEWISCH ET AL., INST. FOR
WOMEN'S POLICY RESEARCH, FACT SHEET: THE GENDER WAGE GAP: 2013:
DIFFERENCES BY RACE AND ETHNICITY: No GROWTH IN REAL WAGES FOR WOMEN

(Mar. 2014), http://www.iwpr.org/publications/pubs/the-gender-wage-gap-2013differences-by-race-and-ethnicity-no-growth-in-real-wages-for-women. See also Joni
Hersch, Male-Female Differences in Hourly Wages: The Role of Human Capital,
Working Conditions, and Housework, 44 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 746, 749-56
(1991), cited in LINDA J. WAITE & MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE:
WHY MARRIED PEOPLE ARE HAPPIER, HEALTHIER, AND BETTER OFF FINANCIALLY

(2000). Much of Hersch's article deals with wage gaps between men and women and
suggests that men may earn more for a variety of reasons ranging from previous
work experience and the likelihood that women select jobs with better conditions
that may pay less to discrimination against women.
I BECKER, supra note 99, at 281.
105Id. at 281-82.
106 LINDA J. WAITE & MAGGIE GALLAGHER, THE CASE FOR MARRIAGE: WHY

MARRIED PEOPLE ARE HAPPIER, HEALTHIER, AND BETTER OFF FINANCIALLY
107 Id. at 25-30, 102-3.

(2000).

times. 108 Because marriages make clear to each spouse that there is a
primacy to the relationship, trust develops that makes the general
benefits that couples gain by living as households of two more
certain. 10 9 Among the general couple's benefits, they note how much
cheaper it is to live as a couple than to maintain two separate
households. They note that looking at poverty guidelines, two people
can live at about 130% of the sum of the cost of each living
separately." 0 Waite and Gallagher further suggest that marriage itself
may be the sort of encouragement that allows people to make better
short and long term economic choices that help them develop a better
standard of living, such as saving more and purchasing real estatethings that help build wealth. They also find that statistically, men in
particular do better economically when married, citin~a study that
men who marry make 17% more than non-married men.
Other studies suggest further reasons marriage may be
economically beneficial. 12 Married couples stay together longer than
cohabiting ones. About half of cohabiting couples separate in the first
in
year and nine out of ten separate within five years."13 This is 114
years.
20
over
of
length
median
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have
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contrast
108

Id. at 31. See also

BRADFORD WILCOX

&

ANDREW J. CHERLIN, CTR. ON

CHILDREN & FAMILIES AT BROOKINGS W., THE MARGINALIZATION OF MARRIAGE IN
MIDDLE AMERICA 2 (2011) (citing studies suggesting that at least when they have

children, a larger percentage of couples stay together for more than 12 years beyond
their children's birth than do non-married couples who have children).
109 WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 106, at 31-35.
110 Id. at 30 (According to the author's calculations, it is presently closer to
135%, as the federal poverty line for two is $15,730, which is almost 135% of the
federal poverty line for one of $11,670). See Annual Update of the HHS Poverty
Guidelines, 79 Fed. Reg. 3,593 (Jan. 22, 2014).
i1 WILCOX & CHERLIN, supra note 108, at 102 (citing Hersch, supra note
103).
112 For a summary of economic studies that have been done looking to whether
marriage is likely to increase economic survival, see ROBERT I. LERMAN, U.S. DEP'T
OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SEC'Y FOR PLANNING &
EVALUATION, MARRIAGE AND THE ECONOMIC WELL-BEING OF FAMILIES WITH
(2002),
LITERATURE
THE
OF
A
REVIEW
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http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/410541_LitReview.pdf.
113 See Daniel T. Lichter, Zhenchao Qian & Leanna M. Mellott, Marriageor
Dissolution?: Union TransitionsAmong Poor Cohabiting Women, 43 DEMOGRAPHY
223, 231 (May 2006) (suggesting that 50% of cohabitations without marriage end
within one year and that 90% end within five years, and that poor couples are less
likely to end their relationships in marriage).
114
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It is much more likely that couples that stay together for twenty years
will be able to obtain the economic benefits of coupling.
There are economists, however, who question whether marriage is
likely to significantly improve the economic status of people, and find
the entire proposition questionable. Although many of these
economists agree with data that suggests that married couples tend to
be in poverty much less than single people 115 and more children in
single-parent families live in poverty, 1F6 many find it unclear whether
having single mothers marry the fathers of their children will do much
to change this. Unmarried men who father children are often younger
and poorer than their married counterparts, and unmarried women
already have less income to contribute to the family than married
women. 17 It is not clear that poor women marrying poor men would
as the women who
develop the same economic characteristics
8
children."1
have
and
marry
presently

... CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME,
POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2011 17

(2012), http://www.census.gov/prod/2012pubs/p60-243.pdf (describing that 6.3% of
married couples are in poverty while 31.7% of female headed households with no
husband present and 15.8% of male headed households with no wife present are in
poverty).
116

CHILDREN

CHILD TRENDS DATABANK, CHILDREN IN POVERTY: INDICATORS ON
http://www.childtrends.org/wp(2014),
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AND
YOUTH

content/uploads/2014/01/04_Poverty.pdf (stating that 9.5% of children are in poverty
who live in families where parents are married, compared to 46.1% of children in
families headed by single mothers).
117 See Cassandra Chaney & Pamela Monroe, Transitions to Engagement
Among Low-Income Cohabiting African American Couples: A Family Perspective
for Policy, 32 J. FAMILY ISSUES 653 (2011) (suggesting that it is in part the economic
and educational limitations of men that are keeping low income couples from
marrying). See also Cohen, supra note 71 (suggesting that marriage promotion
programs do nothing to improve the economic well-being of men with jobs programs
for them but focus only on women's jobs and marrying, making it unlikely that men
will have more money to support their new spouses; and recommending programs
focused on keeping men out of jail and work programs to make them otherwise more
similar economically and educationally to women).
118 Rushton & McLanahan, supra note 5. In this article, the authors interpret
data from the Fragile Families and Child Well-Being Study of Columbia and
Princeton Universities and conclude, among other things, that unless marrying
changes the earning characteristics of people, adding the income of unwed fathers to
that of their unwed mothers would still leave 46% of families below the federal
poverty line (FPL), as compared to the 15% of current married couples below that
line. They also conclude that only 32% of families would be able to earn over 200%
of the FPL if they married and men worked full time at their current earnings while

2. Legal Benefits
Because marriage has been a privileged relationship in American
law, 119 the law provides for many long-term benefits that poor people
must forgo if they do not marry, particularly regarding rights to
property and income. A policy that would allow people to marry
without the severe short-term consequences would allow for these
long-term benefits to assist people later in life.

A primary benefit that married couples gain is a right to each
other's assets. Although some couples give each other rights to

property from the beginning of their relationship by naming one
another on the title of their assets so they are jointly owned, and

although some write wills benefiting a partner, marriage makes it so
that spouses inherit property on death by operation of law. Designed to

ensure a fair division of property in part to replicate divorce property
settlement laws, 120 recent changes to the Uniform Probate Code state

that a surviving spouse is entitled to the first $75,000 of their deceased
spouse's estate on death, and if the estate is more than $150,000, up to
50% of marital property on death. 12 There is no such provision for
people who live together without 22an extensive legal action to prove

some type of equitable ownership.'

women worked half time (accounting for child rearing), as opposed to 68% of
currently married couples.
1'9 Some have questioned whether privileging marriage in the law and
particularly the tax system is appropriate. See Sharon Motro, A New "I Do ": Toward
a Marriage Neutral Income Tax, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1509 (2006), in which Motro
suggests that looking at whether families economically partner is a better way to
address tax issues than whether they marry. See also Katharine K. Baker,
Homogenous Rules For Heterogeneous Families: The Standardization Of Family
Law When There Is No StandardFamily, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 319 (2012).
120 For a description of the making of the new elective share laws in
the most
recent version of the Uniform Probate Code, see Raymond C. O'Brien, Integrating
MaritalPropertyInto A Spouse's Elective Share, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 617 (2010).
121 UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202 (amended 2014). All of the deceased
spouse's income may not be considered part of the marital estate, although under one
alternative in the Uniform Probate Code it would be if the couple is married 15 years
(with a smaller percentage paid otherwise) and under another, the marital estate is
designed to replicate what would be marital property under divorce law. UNIF.
PROBATE CODE § 2-203 (amended 2013).
122 Although it is possible that people who do not marry would be able to
use
lawyers, including low-income legal services attorneys, to plan for these issues, there
is such a dearth of legal services available to the poor that it is unlikely that estate
planning among non-married couples or taking legal action to enforce equitable

Similarly, married people gain support and property rights from
each other upon marriage that determine division of property if the
parties separate. Currently, the best way to secure support rights from
a partner, or to gain an interest in property that a partner obtains during
a relationship, is to be part of a traditional married couple. The law
predominantly recognizes rights of partners in traditional marriages
(for example there are alimony and spousal support rules in every
state). 2 3 Further, although property rights are different in community
property and separate property states, there are property24 division laws
with some form of equitable distribution in every state. 1
3. Rights to Government Benefits
Although this article's main point discusses the government
benefits that people lose in the short term when they marry,
1 25
government benefits do provide incentive to marry in the long term.
These benefits are only small incentive in many cases because, for the
most part, a person has to be of retirement age to qualify. Primarily,
these are social insurance benefits, the most common being Social
Security benefits. For example, spouses married for at least a year who
are 62 or older and qualify for Social Security can get their own
separate check based on their spouse's work records if the amount they
rights in property is possible. As noted in LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE
JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA: THE CURRENT UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF Low-

2009),
(Sept.
AMERICANS
INCOME
http://www.Isc.gov/sites/default/files/LSC/pdfs/documentingthejustice-gap-in-am
erica_2009.pdf, well over one-third of the over 940,000 people anticipated to seek
service in 2009 would seek legal services family law cases (391,000) while 139,000
would have miscellaneous cases including the wills, powers of attorney, and living
wills that would be needed particularly for couples who did not marry and needed
legal documents to get marriage-like outcomes for inheritance and life planning
options.
123 See Baker, supra note 119. See Family Law in the 50 States,
AM. BAR
ASS'N,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/familylaw/resources/familylaw in the 50 sta
tes.html; Linda Elrod & Robert Spector, A Review of the Year in Family Law 20112012: DOMA Challenges Hit Federal Courts and Abduction Cases Increase, 46
FAM. L.Q. 520, 522-523 (2013).
124 Elrod & Specter, supra note 123, at 534-536.
125 There is a question as to whether this is appropriate and whether nontraditional families that are much more common today should receive government
benefits for people who are dependents in other types of family structures. See
Stephen D. Sugarman, What Is A Family? Conflicting Messages From Our Public
Programs,42 FAM. L.Q. 231 (2008).

are entitled to, based on their own work record, is very small or they
do not qualify for the benefit on their own.1 26 These benefits are also
available to divorced people, although the couple must have been
married for ten years before divorcing, 127 and to widow and widowers
as early as age 60 or as early as age 50 if the widow or widower is
themself disabled. 28 Without marrying, partners are not entitled to any
of these benefits. 129 For persons in their twenties, thirties, or forties,
these benefits are so sufficiently distant that they are unlikely to
incentivize marriage or help any time soon, even though they could be
very helpful in the long term.
Similarly, spouses can qualify for Medicare benefits based on their
spouse's eligibility;' 30 and though there may be a waiting period
analogous to that for individuals with disabilities, widow(er)s and
divorced people may also qualify.131
4. Rights to Employee Benefits
A married person is often entitled to pension or health insurance
coverage through their spouse's employer, sometimes based on the
policy options of the employer and sometimes by operation of federal
law. As of 2010, 57.5% of people with incomes between 139% and
250% of the federal poverty level purchased health insurance for their
spouse, compared to 68% of those with incomes between 250% and
400%.132 Health insurance benefits are quite valuable and would not
be available to unmarried partners. Health benefits are so important
that federal law protects these benefits for spouses even after job loss
or if the couple separates. 33 Similarly, a spouse may have rights to

126
127

20 C.F.R. § 404.330 (2011).
20 C.F.R. § 404.331 (2011).

128 20 C.F.R. § 404.335 (2011). In fact, even divorced widows can get benefits
under certain circumstances. 20 C.F.R. § 404.336 (2011).
129 Although this article does not focus on the rights of homosexuals, gay

married couples can now qualify for these benefits as well. See GN 00210.002 SameSex Marriage-DeterminingMarital Statusfor Title 11 and Medicare Benefits, SOC.
SEC. ADMrN. (June 2014), https://secure.ssa.gov/apps 10/poms.nsf/Inx/0200210002.
130 42 C.F.R. § 406.6 (1996).
131 42 C.F.R. § 406.12 (2004).
132
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2010 7-8 (2013), http://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/p70-134.pdf.
C.F.R § 54.4980B-4 (2013).

pension benefits (even
after death or divorce) that are not available to
34
partners.'
unmarried
5. Social Benefits
Some people just want to be married because it makes them happy
or as a way to solidify their relationship. Marriage is clearly celebrated
in many religions and cultures in the United States, including
dominant ones, as sacred partnerings, often with huge celebrations.
The idea in many of these is solidifying values or spiritual and
emotional connections, not economic self-sufficiency.
Further, marriage makes many people happier 35and clearly many
people choose marriage because they think it will make them happier.
Married people live longer than their non-married counterparts,
suggesting that there is an impact on health. 136 There are also data that
suggests that there is less domestic violence between partners who are
married, 137 with married women reporting abuse less than one-third as
often as unmarried, divorced, or separated women. 138 Removing
barriers to marriage for these reasons could be of great benefit to the
poor.
III. WELFARE MARRIAGE PENALTIES THAT DISCOURAGE
MARRIAGE

With the economic benefits to encourage marriage and with
American welfare policy explicitly stating that the country wants to
encourage marriage, one would think that welfare laws would
reinforce the benefits of marriage. However, as described in this
134

Legal procedures exist in every state based on federal law that anticipates

spouses gaining these rights through qualified domestic relations orders. 26 U.S.C. §
414(p)( 1)(A)(20 14).
135 See WAITE & GALLAGHER, supra note 106, at 65-77 (suggesting not only
that married people are on average happier but also that it is not just happy people
that marry, but the marriage itself that makes people happier).
136 Id. at 47-64.
117 Id. at 150-160.
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http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ipv9310.pdf (showing an overall decline in
domestic violence and suggesting that two out of every 1,000 married people 12 or
older have been victims of domestic violence while eight of every 1000 never
married people, 6.5 of every 1,000 divorced or widowed people, and 59 of every
1,000 separated people were victims in 2010).

section, the application of welfare law does the exact opposite by
removing welfare benefits that make up a necessary part of a couple's
income.
This is true primarily for public assistance programs, which are
designed to provide support to those without other sources of income.
Insofar as a new spouse can provide support to an individual, it is not
unreasonable to assume that a married person would require less
outside support than an unmarried person. As discussed in Part I, every
state requires that spouses support one another financially. 139
However, as will be seen with most of the programs, incorrect
assumptions are made regarding the value of pooled assets versus need
resulting in welfare benefits being removed quite quickly,
impoverishing both spouses.
As will also be seen, it is also true for some social insurance
programs. Although those programs are designed for workers and
often do not consider income or resources when determining a
person's eligibility, there are some limited aspects of social insurance
programs which are based on need and where benefits are reduced by
marriage penalties. Further, some eligibility criteria for these programs
are based on being single and on the presumption that a person
needing this social insurance benefit would not need the help once
they married, as they could rely on their spouses' income alone. This is
a presumption that can be flawed.
A. Social InsurancePrograms
1. Social Security
Social Security is designed to support those who need help based
on disability or age, and also to support their dependents. Among those
who are supported as dependents are children under 18; 140 adult
children who themselves have disabilities that began before age 22;141
spouses, widows, and widowers; 42 and dependent parents.143 Perhaps
because the rationale for these benefits stems from being dependent on
139
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42 U.S.C. § 402(d) (1995).
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42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(l)(B)(ii) (1995).
42 U.S.C. § 402(b)-(f) (1995).
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14'

42 U.S.C. § 402(h) (1995).

the primary beneficiary, many of the benefits end upon a new marriage
based on the assumption that the new spouse will provide additional
resources. Under each of these programs, marriage can eliminate
needed benefits even if the new spouse has little or no income. Below
is a partial list of Social Security programs where benefits are
withdrawn from a former dependent recipient at the time of marriage:
i. Disabled Adult Children
People who receive these benefits as disabled adult children lose
these benefits upon marriage. The benefits can be substantial. A
disabled adult child can receive up to half of what their parent is
receiving or up to three-quarters of what their deceased parent would
have received. 144 As a maximum benefit amount for an adult in 2014
was $2,642, a disabled adult child could have received up to $1,981
per month.
This benefit, however, is completely eliminated if the recipient
marries. 145 Once married, that beneficiary is seen as no longer the
dependent of their parent and therefore is ineligible for Social Security
benefits. 146 Although there is an exception if the beneficiary marries
another person who also qualifies for Social Security,' 47 marrying
another person in similar need is perhaps not the type of marriage that
a marriage promotion policy is looking to encourage. A disabled adult
child therefore has financial incentive to live with a partner outside of
marriage.

ii. Survivors
In most cases, widows and widowers who remarry do not lose
benefits. Although they generally have to be unmarried to obtain these
benefits in the first place, there are exceptions that allow people to
retain benefits after marriage if over age 60.148 This covers most
'44
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20 C.F.R. § 404.353 (2011).

See Robert E. Rains, Disability and Family Relationships: Marriage

Penaltiesand Support Anomolies, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 561, 562-566 (2006).
146 20 C.F.R. § 404.352(b)(4) (2011).
147 id.

148 20 C.F.R. § 404.335(e) (2011).

widows and widowers, as people cannot qualify for these benefits until
they reach age 60 or unless they reach age 50 and have a disability. 49
Social Security does not cover people who remarry while seeking
benefits, unless
they can show that the disability began prior to the
50

remarriage. 1

iii. Parents
Parents of workers who qualify for Social Security have marriage
disincentives. These individuals, after attaining age 62, become
eligible for up to 82.5% of the amount of Social Security that their
child would have received if their child was paying at least half of
their support at the time they died.15 If they are already married before
their child died and they still relied on that child for support, there is
no ban on receiving the benefits.' 52 However, if people marry between
the time that the child dies and they apply for benefits, they cannot
receive them, no matter how much the person they marry earns.
Further, once on the benefits, people lose those benefits if they marry
unless they marry another person on Social Security, again without
any consideration of how much the working spouse earns.3
2. Medicare "Extra Help" for Part D
Medicare Part D pays for prescription medication for people
eligible for Social Security based on age or a disability.' 54 Because
Medicare D does not pay the entire cost of prescription drugs,
Medicare D has a low-income subsidy program sometimes called
"extra help," which requires states to subsidize recipients who are low
income and cannot pay those costs. 155 Although some of the subsidies
are to lower costs of all prescriptions covered under the plan, a large
part of the subsidy deals with the "donut hole" portion of the plan,
under which beneficiaries are required to pay a substantial percentage
of the cost of medication.156 As described in one of the examples in the
introduction to this article, the asset and income limits that a person
149 Id.
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20 C.F.R. § 404.335(e) (2011).
20 C.F.R. § 404.373 (2011).
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20 C.F.R. § 404.370(c) (2011).
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can have to qualify for a full or partial subsidy include a spouse's
income. For example, a person who is close to the asset limit may
exceed that limit after marriage thereby resulting in an increase in cost
of medications far greater than the increase in assets.157 Further,
because people must be below 135% of the federal poverty level for a
full subsidy and 150% for any subsidy, spouses who add around $500
total income to the household can render both spouses ineligible for
benefits. 158 This is a marriage disincentive for older people on fixed
incomes who cannot afford these expenses and need medication,
particularly if they have or anticipate extraordinary medical needs.
Couples that do not marry can keep their income and assets separate
even if they live together and may qualify for these benefits.
B. PublicAssistance Programs
1. Supplemental Security Income
If there were a place where it is clear that marriage penalties could
only be counterproductive, it is the SSI program. To qualify for SSI,
people must be over 65 years old, blind, or have a disability that has
been found by a disability determination agency or administrative law
judge to be so severe that it precludes work for at least twelve months
or is expected to result in death. By this definition, people qualified for
SSI have a condition that affects them so severely that they are
unlikely to be able to support themselves through work.
Yet marrying someone of low income or another person on SSI
carries such a stiff penalty that many choose not to marry. 159 A person
on SSI receives $721 per month with a possible small state supplement
depending on the state of residence. If the person marries another
person on SSI, they both lose one quarter of their check, receiving
$1,081 total per month and leaving them below the $1,310.83 per
month poverty line. If instead the couple does not marry but lives
together, they would each receive $721. per month, totaling $1,442.
Marrying, therefore, decreases the couple's income by 25%. Although
157

See 42 C.F.R. §§ 423.773(b)-(d) (2010); Ctr. for Medicare & Medicaid

Serv., 2014 Resource and Cost-SharingLimitsfor Low-Income Subsidy (LIS), DEP'T
SERV.
(Nov.
6,
2013),
OF
HEALTH
&
HUMAN
http://www.coeha.com/2014%20LIS%20Asset%2OLevels%2OMemo%20to%20Plan
s.pdf.
158 42 C.F.R. § 423.773 (2008).
159 For a summary of some of these penalties, see Rains, supra note 145, at
566-570.

it is a large assumption that people can live comfortably just above the
poverty line, this couple's only choice to live above the poverty line is
to live together without marrying. 60
If instead of marrying another recipient the SSI beneficiary marries
a person who is working, the couple will still suffer a large loss of
combined income. First, if the worker has any significant savings, the
couple will not be eligible for SSI at all. A person cannot receive SSI
61
if they and their spouse own more than $3,000 in non-exempt assets.'
This means that if the worker has $3,000 in the bank or a life insurance
policy with significant face value, among other things, the person's
SSI is cut off entirely. This makes it so that the couple must live
entirely on the spouse's income. A couple with a minimum wage
worker making $1,200 per month would have their joint income
reduced by the $721 SSI check (37% of their income) which would
drive the minimum wage worker into poverty. A minimum wage
worker family making $1,685 per month would lose 30% of their
income and a $2,500 per month worker's family would lose 22% of
their income. This same result occurs if the couple is unfortunate
enough to develop savings while together, savings that government
policy would probably wish to encourage. Clearly, each of these
families would be financially better off living together out of wedlock
thereby avoiding these penalties but preventing the couple from
obtaining the benefits of marriage.
However, if the marrying couple does not have $3,000 in assets,
there are still many instances in which married couples lose a large
percentage of their income. For the person marrying the minimum
wage worker at $1,208 per month, the person's SSI check at least
would drop over $200 due to spousal deeming rules, leaving the
couple's total income at about $1,710 per month. 62 This couple,
160

This result is understood by the Social Security Administration and repeated

in several of its policy statements. See Richard Balkus & Susan Wilschke, Treatment
of Married Couples in the SS1 Program (Soc. Sec. Admin., Office of Policy, Issue
Paper No. 2003-01, 2003), http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/issuepapers/ip20030l.html (noting the disadvantage of marrying). See also Melissa Koenig & Kalman
Rupp, SS1 Recipients in Households and Families with Multiple Recipients:
Prevalenceand Poverty Outcomes, 65 SOCIAL SECURITY BULLETIN 14 (2003/2004),
availableat http://www.ssa.gov/policy/docs/ssb/v65n2/v65n2p 14.pdf (discussing the

advantage of being an unmarried two-recipient household).
161 42 U.S.C. § 1382(a)(3)(A)(2013).
162 For these SSI calculations, it is assumed that the person on SSI has
no other
income. By regulation, the calculations are made by subtracting the federal benefit
rate of $721 per month from the worker's income, giving the worker an $85 credit

which is now slightly over the poverty line, would have been better off
living together and not marrying, where they would have received
$1,918 per month, those $200 per month representing more than 10%
of the couple's income being taxed away for the privilege of marrying
and being quite significant for a couple living on such little money. If
the worker earned $1,685 per month, the person's SSI check would
drop about $440, lowering household income from what could have
been $2,406 to $1,966, or 18%. If the worker earned $2,500 per
month, the spouse would lose the entire SSI benefit or 29% of the
couple's combined income. Although this couple is living at 185% of
the federal poverty level, losing 29% of income is a very large amount
that most cannot afford when living on $2,500.
The penalties are less severe if the family has children. A family
with a child does not have benefits lowered until the family earns
about $1,530 per month, 163 although families with children qualifying64
for some other government assistance do not get this favored status.
Again, in most65cases, a couple is better off not marrying or not living
together at all. 1
2. TANF
TANF is a block grant administered differently in different states,
and how marriage affects TANF eligibility varies among states as
well. It is an interesting program for the purpose of considering
marriage penalties because it is the one where explicit policy states
that encouraging marriage and two parent families is a specific goal of
the program, as discussed above. The grants are incredibly low,
averaging $426 per month for a family of three.' 6 6 This makes having
other money coming in extremely important to a family, so important
that the family may be willing to forgo the grant for hopes of even a
minimum wage job. However, even a grant this small could boost

for deductions, and then subtracting one dollar from every two dollars beyond that
earned by the worker. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.1163 (1996).
163 20 C.F.R. § 416.1163(b) (1996).
'64 See 20 C.F.R. § 416.1142(a) (1996).
165 Not discussed above is the presumed value rule, which penalizes people by
one-third of their SSI check who live with another and who are not paying their prorata share of basic necessities. 20 C.F.R. § 416.1131. However, assuming a person
can show they are paying half of the rent and food out of their $721 per month SSI
and potential SNAP food benefits, they are not penalized this way.
166 See supra text accompanying note 43.

family income by 25% for a minimum wage earner and give the family
67
the chance to reach the poverty level if they could keep the money.'
However, despite the stated goals of supporting marriage, marriage
penalties are still abundant in TANF programs. Although it is not
practical to go through all of the variations for all of the states and how
they deal with spouses, there are several generalizations that can be
made. First, in a survey of TANF rules, Robert A. Moffitt describes
that in all fifty states, if a mother and father are living together with
their children, both the mother and father's income is included in
determining eligibility.' 68 This means that there is an incentive for
parents to separate and not to live together to raise their children,
something the TANF law was not trying to accomplish. There is no
disincentive to marry if a couple wants to live in the same household,
but they are better off not doing that in the first place. A father not
living in the household will likely be sued for child support if he does
not live in the household, but the family will get a higher TANF
amount and the family will likely have higher income.
Moffitt continues by looking at several other types of families. In
blended families, where the couple each has children in the household,
33 states include the father in the family unit whether or not he is
married to the mother, again making it so that there is no disincentive
to marrying if the couple plans to live together, but perhaps creating an
incentive for the father to leave the home entirely. Five states allow the
father's income to be excluded from the household income if the
adults are not married, clearly a marriage disincentive. In 12 states and
the District of Columbia, the father's income can be excluded from the
eligibility calculation if the
father's income would preclude the family
69
from receiving benefits.'
In cases where people who cohabit are not related, many states do
not consider the cohabiter's income at all, with four or five states
penalizing beneficiaries who receive help from these cohabiters by
lowering their grants.170 Perhaps assuming that an unrelated male is in
a romantic relationship if he lives in the household with a female and
167 See supra text accompanying note 55 (showing that a minimum wage job
leaves people at 75% below the federal poverty level for a family of three).
168 See Robert A. Moffitt et al., Cohabitation and Marriage Rules in State

TANF Programs 8 (Rand Labor & Population Working Paper No. 585-1, 2009),
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/working_papers/2009/RANDWR5851.pdf.
169 id.
170 Id. at 10 (Some of those states include California, Kansas, Minnesota, North
Dakota, and West Virginia).

her children, Oklahoma considers all males in the home as if they were
the fathers of the children and deems their income.171 And in stepfather
families, all but three states deem a stepfather's
72 income to the family,
making it better to cohabit without marrying.'
Deeming the spouse's income and resources in making TANF
calculations is a huge marriage disincentive because TANF amounts
decrease to nothing quite quickly. For example, in Pennsylvania, if
parents are married and the household now has more than $1,000 in
assets, the entire family is excluded from benefits. 173 If the man was
not the father of the child in the household and they did not marry, the
man's assets would not necessarily be counted as he could be excluded
from the budget unit.1 74 Further, although the state would increase the
family's TANF grant by $90 if a father moved in with his family, the
family would be penalized as soon as he began working by deducting
from the grant amount by $1 for every $2 earned, meaning that if the
man earns more than $180 per month, the benefit is decreased from
what it was before he moved in and if he earns more than $806
75 for a
three person family, the family becomes ineligible for benefits.1
Because there is a specific mandate within TANF to try to abolish
marriage penalties, some steps have been taken to do so. Before
TANF, under the old Aid to Families with Dependent Children twoparent program, a family was ineligible if either parent worked more
than 100 hours per month. Further, there was a waiting period to be
eligible for the program where an employed parent had to be
unemployed for 30 days before they would qualify. 176 Each of these
might discourage marriage to someone who was trying to work.
However, at the same time that these rules were being dropped in
many states, 177 TANF was putting in place rules that required 90% of
two parent households to meet thirty-hour per week requirements
while only 50% of single parent households had to do so, making it

171Id.
172 Id. at

11.

17355 PA. CODE §
174 55 PA. CODE §

177.31 (1988).

177.21(a)(1) (1988).
PA. CODE § 183.94 (1999).
176For an explanation of these rules, see FALK & TAUBER, supra note 96, at
10-12.
177 See Moffitt et al., supra note 168, at 13 (stating that although three-quarters
175 55

of states had 100 hour work rules and 30 day unemployment requirements in 1996
when TANF replaced AFDC, only one-fifth of states still had these rules in 2006).

less likely that a second parent would
be encouraged to move into the
8
home and discouraging marriage.17
Other policies that have been put in place in some states to
encourage TANF families to marry include policies in eight states that
have some income disregards for newly-married couples. As described
by Moffitt, Oklahoma and Idaho have some form of a special earned
income disregard for stepfathers, five states disregard income for
newly-married couples, and two other states have higher disregards for
new spouses.179 Generally, however, marriage will decrease a TANF
benefit.
3. Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP)
Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) (also known
as "food stamps") benefits are some of the most important benefits that
people can receive. Forty-seven million people rely on these benefits
for help in 23 million households.180 In 2005, for example, the SNAP
program was responsible for raising 1.6 million children out of deep
poverty.181
SNAP benefits are distributed by household. This means that if
people live separately, they may be eligible for separate SNAP
benefits and the individual and thus total benefits may be higher.
Further, although a person can live in the same house and not be
considered part of a household, SNAP regulations require that a
spouse be considered a household member.'8 2 Therefore, although a
person moving in and not marrying would also be considered a
household member if the couple shares meals,' 8 3 their income and
assets are not considered when calculating the SNAP benefit grant if
the person argues they are not sharing meals or if they do not move in
at all.
This is a large disincentive to marry. Due to changes in the law,
not all states have asset limits when calculating SNAP benefits and
178

See 42 U.S.C. § 607 (2002).

179 Moffitt, supra note 168, at 13.

180 Dottie Rosenbaum, SNAP Is Effective and Efficient, CTR. ON BUDGET &
POLICY PRIORITIES (Mar. 11, 2013),
181 See EDELMAN, supra note

http://www.cbpp.org/cms/?fa=view&id=3239.
34, at 82 (citing ARLOC SHERMAN, SAFETY NET

EFFECTIVE AT FIGHTING POVERTY BUT HAS WEAKENED FOR THE VERY POOREST

(July 6, 2009), http://www.cbpp.org/files/7-6-09pov.pdf (defining deep poverty as

being below 50% of the federal poverty level)).
82 See 7 C.F.R. § 273.1(b)(1)(i) (2010).
183 See 7 C.F.R. § 273.1(a)(2) (2010).

some have higher benefits than first set out in the law. 184 However,
many states do have asset limits, and they can be as low as $2,000 for
a household. 185 Marrying a person with even these limited assets
makes the couple ineligible for benefits.
Income rules are complex for SNAP benefits. Increased household
income, however, often lowers benefits and marrying can easily cause
a penalty, causing a severe reduction in benefits. For example, if after
deductions and expenses a married couple merging into one household
has income over 130%
of the federal poverty level, SNAP benefits are
86
1
eliminated.
entirely
4. Medical Assistance
Because Medical Assistance programs are administered by each
state differently and because there are so many different ways to
qualify for Medical Assistance, marriage penalties vary greatly
between programs and between states. The United States Department
of Health and Human Services Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services counts over 70 ways that a person can be found eligible for
Medicaid mandatory programs alone.' 87 Without going through all of
them, however, it is clear that there are marriage penalties in many of
the programs. For the Medical Assistance program categories that are
tied to SSI eligibility, the penalties are the same as SSI marriage
penalties. At present, there are 40 states and the District of Columbia
that use SSI criteria to determine if many of their potential recipients
are eligible.' 88 For 10 other states, called 209(b) states, 189 restrictions
can be, and sometimes are, harsher than those in the SSI program. In
184

Modernizing Asset Limits: Promoting Savings, Simplicity, and Self-

Sufficiency, NEW AM. FOUND., http://assetlimits.newamerica.net/content/asset-limits-

your-state.
185 7 C.F.R. § 273.8(b) (2010). The asset limit must be at least $3,000 if the
household contains a person with a disability or someone over 60.
186 7 C.F.R. § 273.9(a) (2010).
187 See U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Serv., Centers for Medicare &
Medicaid Serv., List of Medicaid Eligibility Groups Mandatory CategoricallyNeedy,
http://www.medicaid.gov/Medicaid-CHIP-Program-lnformation/ByTopics/Waivers/ 1115/Downloads/List-of-Eligibility-Groups.pdf.
188 See SI 01715.010 Medicaid and the Supplemental Security
Income (SSI)
Program,
SOC.
SEC.
ADMIN.
(May
30,
2014),
https://secure.ssa.gov/poms.nsf/lnx/0501715010; SI 01715.020 List of State Medicaid
Programsfor the Aged, Blind and Disabled, SOC. SEC. ADMIN. (May 30, 2014)
[hereinafter SS1 Program], for a list of states with each type of program.
189 42 C.F.R. § 435.121(a) (2013).

all of these cases, the marriage penalties are at least as severe as those
for the SSI program.
Although eligibility for Medical Assistance is greatly expanded
under the Affordable Care Act, eligibility continues to depend on a
person having relatively low income to qualify. For this reason,
marriage penalties remain an issue in those states that have opted to
expand eligibility for Medical Assistance. For example, a couple with
combined income over $1,800 per month, which is 138% of the
federal poverty level, is over the income threshold to qualify for
Medical Assistance. It is hoped that those people might be able to buy
insurance from a health insurance exchange, but that is an expense that
acts as a marriage penalty for those who might have qualified for
Medical Assistance otherwise.
1 90

C. Some Other Government Benefit Programs
1. Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC)

The EITC is a program under which income tax filers are given a
subsidy or negative tax based on the amount they earn. 19 Under EITC
in 2014, people could obtain up to $496 per year if they had no
children, $3,305 if they had one, $5,460 if they had two, and up to
$6,143 per year if they had three or more children.' 92 It is a significant
source of income for many workers and a program that is touted by
many as an effective means of transferring income to low-income

190 Although the author might catalogue EITC and the Affordable Care Act
benefits as public assistance, it is thought that this is both beyond the scope of this
article and could be distracting from the argument. They are, however, funds that
come from the general tax base to support people who cannot fully support
themselves through work.
'9' 26 U.S.C. § 32 (2013). Section 209(b) states are those states that use criteria
more restrictive than SSI criteria to determine if a person qualifies for benefits. See

SSI Program,supra note 188.

192 See 26 U.S.C. § 32(f) (2013). The actual figures are produced in tables
each
year in IRS Publication 596. For the 2014 figures, see INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,

EITC INCOME LIMITS, MAXIMUM CREDIT AMOUNTS AND TAX LAW UPDATES (Nov.

24, 2014), http://www.irs.gov/lndividuals/EITC-Income-Limits,-Maximum-Credit-Amounts-and-Tax-Law-Updates [hereinafter TAX LAW UPDATES]. For a good
summary of how the EITC works, see TAX POLICY CTR., BROOKINGS INST.,
TAXATION AND THE FAMILY: WHAT IS THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT (2014),

http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/key-elements/family/eitc.cfm.

people who need it while encouraging the recipient to continue to
work. 193
The marriage penalty in the EITC is well understood and it upsets
many.' 94 The statute itself now has specific language addressing the
penalty and giving an extra $5,000 disregard on spouse's income in
order to begin to deal with the penalty. 95Nevertheless, the marriage
penalty remains and the credit phases out quickly when people marry.
For example, a person with a child will see their credit begin to phase
out if they earn at least $17,830, while a couple will see the same
credit begin to phase out at $22,360. 96 Two people who each earn
$15,000, for example, would be much better off not marrying and
getting the almost full tax credit rather than97 being assessed as a couple
with an income of $30,000 and ineligible.'
Marriage can create an EITC bonus, as it is possible that a couple's
joint earnings can qualify them for a higher credit, most often if their
incomes are disparate. 198 However, marriage causes penalties twice as
often as it provides bonuses,' 99 making the EITC a large marriage
disincentive for low-wage workers.
2. Medical Insurance Subsidies Through the Affordable Care Act
193

See

CHUCK MARR, CHYE-CHING HUANG & ARLOC SHERMAN, CTR. ON
BUDGET AND POLICY PRIORITIES, EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT PROMOTES WORK,
ENCOURAGES CHILDREN'S SUCCESS AT SCHOOL, RESEARCH FINDS: FOR CHILDREN,
RESEARCH INDICATES THAT WORK, INCOME, AND HEALTH BENEFITS EXTEND INTO
ADULTHOOD (Apr. 15, 2014), http://www.cbpp.org/files/6-26-12tax.pdf.
194 See Lawrence Zelenak, Doing Something About Marriage Penalties: A

Guidefor the Perplexed, 54 TAX L. REV. 1, 46-55 (2000), for a summary of some of
these arguments and some possible solutions. See also Anne L. Alstott, The Earned
Income Tax Credit And The Limitations Of Tax-Based Welfare Reform, 108 HARV.
L. REV. 533 (1995) (for a description of the program and marriage penalties,
although also a critique of the entire project as difficult to administer fairly).
26 U.S.C. § 32(b)(3)(B) (2013). For a brief history of the last few changes
in the EITC that promises to be updated every year, see CHRISTINE SCOTT, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT (EITC): CHANGES FOR 2012
AND 2013 (Jan. 31, 2013), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS21352.pdf.
196 TAX LAW UPDATES, supra note 192.
'9' See Jennifer Bird-Pollan, Who's Afraid of Redistribution? An Analysis of
the Earned Income Tax Credit, 74 Mo. L. REV. 251, 266-272 (2008), for a further
look at how this penalty works and considerations around reforming the EITC to
account for having more children and for other family structures.
198 Id. at 266-67.
199 See WILLIAMS & WEINER, supra note 2. See also STEVE HOLT, BROOKINGS
INST., THE EARNED INCOME TAX CREDIT AT AGE 30: WHAT WE KNOW 15-16 (Feb.
2006) (citations omitted).

The Affordable Care Act's health care premium reductions and
cost subsidies can be significant for people under 400% of the poverty
level, a subsidy that can be easily lost by marrying. People pay
between 2% to 9.5% of their income toward their health insurance
premium, dependent on their income. The amount of the subsidy
increases quickly. People with income of 100-133% of the federal
poverty level receive a tax credit for the amount of the insurance
premium that exceeds 2% of their monthly income. There is a sliding
scale for people who earn between 133-400% of the poverty level.
Those people receive a tax credit for the amount that the insurance
premium that exceeds 3-9.5% of their income. 20 0 Beyond this, there is
reduced cost-sharing of expenses ranging from two-thirds to one-third
of costs for people, again with higher subsidies
given for people closer
20 1
to 100% of poverty than 400% of poverty.
Although it would be difficult to go through the myriad of
examples that would show how marriage can decrease these subsidies,
it is clear that marrying someone who puts the family into a new
income bracket can significantly reduce the government help that
people receive from this program. For instance, a recently published
example in the Atlantic describes a couple earning $45,000 each, who
would individually qualify for a premium reduction and subsidies if
they did not marry. If they did marry, however, they would lose the
help entirely, as married couples earning as little as $62,000 are
ineligible.20 2
As this example describes people who are significantly over the
federal poverty line, it may not seem as important. Further, as the
Atlantic article points out, people who make this much money may be
more likely to get health insurance as a benefit from their jobs.20 3
200
20'
202

26 U.S.C. § 36B(b)(3)(A)(1) (2011).
42 U.S.C. §§ 18071(c)(1)(A)(i)-(iii) (2010).
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(citations

omitted),

http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2013/1 1/the-hidden-marriage-penalty-in-

obamacare/280890/.
203 Id. (According to Franke-Ruta, 15.4% of married couples
are uninsured
compared to 33.4% of single ones (citing studies from the Kaiser Family
Foundation)). See also

HUBERT JANICKI, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, EMPLOYMENTBASED HEALTH INSURANCE: 2010: HOUSEHOLD ECONOMIC STUDIES 7 (Feb. 2013),

http://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/p70-134.pdf (showing that people who work
with earnings below 138% of the federal poverty level have a 43.3% chance of
having their employer offer health insurance benefits while people who earn over

However, it can be a large increase in health premium that can
204
discourage marriage.
3. Other Programs
Clearly, the above cases are not an exhaustive inventory of all
types of welfare and their marriage penalties. Some other benefits that
were not described above that are very important to families include
public housing subsidies. Housing subsidies were left out of this article
mostly because the program is so poorly funded that it is relatively
small and getting smaller, making it less likely that people are on the
program in the first place. Still, this is a highly important program to
many people and the only way people can afford to live on the small
205
amounts of government assistance they receive or on low wages.
For those who can get onto the housing subsidies program, there are
several programs sponsored by HUD that deliver affordable housing to
individuals by charging them 30% of their income for rent. 206
Qualifying for housing is based on having income below a certain
percentage of income limits, where those qualifying have extremely
low-income and are more likely to be eligible for housing if earning
50% or less of the median local average income. In Philadelphia, for
example, a single person has to earn less than $16,600 per year to

401% of the federal poverty level who would not qualify for a subsidy have an
80.8% chance of having health insurance offered).
204 Besides discouraging marriage, some believe that the Affordable Care Act
discourages work, too. They fear that people will not seek better paying employment
because they will lose health insurance. They also fear small employers will stop
choosing to provide health insurance under any circumstances they can. See David
Gamage, How The Affordable Care Act Will Create Perverse Incentives Harming
Low and Moderate Income Workers, 69 TAx L. REV. 669 (2012). Although it has

been raised in other contexts that work is often a disincentive when people fear
losing welfare benefits due to working, some fear it is particularly pronounced with
healthcare as there are fewer people who would be better off getting welfare than
working a low to moderate income job, while there are more who they fear will not
be able to afford healthcare on a low salary.

205 See, e.g., Petula Dvorak, In D.C., a Public-Housing Waiting List With No
End, WASH. POST, Apr. 11, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/in-dc-apublic-housing-waiting-list-with-no-end/2013/04/11/6073e7d2-a2cc- 11 e2-9c03-

6952ff305f35_story.html (noting the length of time on a waiting list for a studio
apartment in Washington, D.C., is 39 years, and 28 years for a one-bedroom).
206 Although this is available in regulations, it is most clearly set out by HUD.
See
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PROGRAM,

qualify for an apartment.2 °7 However, a couple has to earn below
$18,950 per year, meaning that marrying someone who brings in only
$2,350 per year can put a person's public housing at risk. Even if the
couple moves into a one bedroom house renting at $1,000 per month,
the couple loses $700 in income help per month or $8,400 per year,
even if their income is $19,000 per year. It is a significant marriage
penalty.
Also not included in the survey of programs with marriage
penalties are pharmaceutical assistance programs, 20 8 attendant care and
other Medical Assistance waiver programs, 2°9 and the Women, Infants,
and Children (WIC) program, 2 1 among others.
III. SOME POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS

The penalties described in this article do not have to be so harsh. In
fact, many do not have to exist at all. Assuming that the United States
wants to promote marriage or that it would like to remove financial
207
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http://www.huduser.org/portal/datasets/il/il14/index.html (follow "Tables for.Section
8 Income Limits" at 182) (for income limits available).
208 According to the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services,
there are 21
states and the Virgin Islands that have these programs. See State Pharmaceutical
MEDICARE.GOV,
Programs,
Assistance
http://www.medicare.gov/(X( 1)S(lrrvj4551 baqdf55j 1bdsmrs))/pharmaceuticalEach
assistance-program/state-programs.aspx?AspxAutoDetectCookieSupport= 1.
program has its own restrictions. For example, in Pennsylvania, a single person can
have up to $14,500 in annual income while a couple can have up to $17,700, creating
a marriage penalty.
209 Under waiver programs, states can provide medical assistance
to people
making higher amounts of income or with higher resources for specific purposes
often related to keeping people from being institutionalized and providing services
for them in their home and the community. 42 U.S.C. § 1396n (2010). These
programs have their own guidelines and generally have marriage penalties at much
higher levels of income as they allow for earning and having more money. However,
the author can report several examples of people wanting to marry who cannot
because of potential spouses having money set aside for things such as college
expenses for children or saving toward a home where keeping these benefits has
precluded marriage.
210 WIC, or the "Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women,
Infants,
§ 1786
42
U.S.C.
provides
nutrition
and
counseling
to
new
mothers.
and Children,"
(2013). Many qualify based on eligibility for other programs or by meeting school
lunch income eligibility guidelines (42 U.S.C. § 1786(d) (2013)), which are set at
185% of the federal poverty level. 42 U.S.C. § 1758(b)(1) (2011). Adding another
person to a household allows that person to earn about $425 more per month before a
person close to the income limit loses this benefit.

barriers to marriage for the poor so that decisions regarding marriage
can be based on economic, legal, or emotional reasons, policies could
reflect this desire.
A. Adopt a Spousal Impoverishment Standardfor More of our
Welfare Programs,Similar to the Standardfor Institutionalized
Spouses UnderMedical Assistance
One of the largest problems for many of the programs described in
this article is that when couples marry, the income and resources of the
spouses who have assets to bring to the marriage are considered
available to poorer spouses before it is considered whether the spouses
with income and assets have enough money to support the couple
without government help. One way to protect against this problem
would be to use a reasonable spousal impoverishment standard to
assess whether spouses have enough money to support themselves
before their income and resources are deemed to their spouses. Once a
richer spouse who does not seek independent welfare assistance
reaches a more reasonable standard, what is left could be deemed to
the non-moneyed spouse.
This is not a radical idea but is an idea that is already used in some
welfare programs, including the Medical Assistance benefit for
institutionalized spouses. This program is most often used when a
spouse must go into a nursing home and needs Medical Assistance to
pay for it. For this program, the federal government agrees with a
concept described earlier in this article that the poverty rate is set too
low and sets a higher standard to try to ensure that spouses are not
impoverished by trying to enable the spouses to take care of each
other. Under the Medical Assistance's spousal impoverishment
guidelines for this program, the non-institutionalized spouse, or
"community spouse," is allowed to have assets and income in his or
her own name which are not attributed to the calculation of the
assistance to which the institutionalized spouse is entitled.2 1 It is a
marriage promotion statute itself, designed to ensure that couples do
not have to divorce to save the resources of the non-institutionalized
spouse or to require the non-institutionalized spouse's resources to go
toward nursing home care.
Under this program, community spouses are entitled to a
"minimum monthly maintenance needs allowance" of 150% of the
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federal poverty level with a potential extra housing allowance. 212
Community spouses are also entitled to resources in their own name
and are entitled to transfer joint assets into the community spouses'
names at much higher rates than are allowed for other welfare
programs. 213 Because the 150% level fluctuates with the consumer
price index along with the resource limitations, a community spouse is
allowed to have $1,966.25 with a potential $589.88 housing allowance
for a total of $2,556.13 per month in income. At the states'
prerogative, the community spouse can also have an amount set
between $23,448 and $117,240 in resources excluding a home that can
be valued at the states' choice at up to between $543,000 and
$814,000.214

This could be done with other programs as well and reduce the
effect of marriage penalties. Allowing spouses to keep income in their
own name up to $2,556.13 before deeming income to new spouses and
allowing spouses to have $117,240 in their own name, plus their
homes, before counting it against their spouses would accomplish a
few things. This modification would allow people to live at 150% of
the federal poverty level before any welfare benefits were subtracted
from joint income, which may not be enough on which to live, 215' but
might not devastate the new family hoping to marry. The changes
would also allow couples to begin to develop assets together, as the
economic theorists promoting marriage have hoped, by allowing a
spouse to develop assets without fear of losing needed welfare
benefits.
B. Make the Income and Resource Limitsfor Couples Double That of
Thosefor Individuals andMore Generous if Familiesare Larger
This is also not a radical concept, but something that has been done
with the tax system for several years. In order to reduce marriage
penalties for the middle class, tax rates were adjusted to deal with the
problem that when two single people married, their tax rate would
increase as they move up in tax brackets. To deal with this, the law
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was changed so that that married couples pay the same rate of tax as
they would pay if they had not married and were single, up until a
couple earns $148,500. 2 16 This makes it so that people in lower income
brackets who do not rely on welfare can many with no income tax
penalty.
This could be applied similarly to people who need welfare
benefits to make ends meet. Welfare benefits are often reduced upon
marriage if both people are on welfare, even though they are clearly at
a low income level. For example, if two people on SSI who would get
$721 per month each received $1,421 per month when they married
instead of being penalized and having their joint income lowered to
$1,081 per month, those people could marry and work toward taking
advantage of what marriage offered them. Monthly income of $1,421
puts the couple slightly over the federal poverty level, while $1,081.50
leaves them more than $200 short of it. Marriage would be
incentivized, not penalized.
Similarly, if resource and income limitations were made double
what they were for an individual when a couple married, it would be of
great benefit to clients. Using SSI again as an example, a single person
is allowed to have $2,000 in assets while a couple can only have
$3,000 in assets. 217 It would be a small step to allow a couple to have
twice the assets of an individual to qualify for the program and have
$4,000.
C. Raise the ParticularlyLow Income andResource Limits to Receive
PublicAssistance Benefits in All Programs,but Particularlyfor
Spouses
Income and resource limits for many programs have been kept
very low for many years, in part because they have not been set to alter
with inflation. SSI, for example, has not increased its resource
limitations since 1989. 218 In 1989, the SSI monthly amount was set at
$368 for an individual and $553 for a couple, based on cost of living
increases that happened during some, but not all, years. 219 Because
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there have been consistent cost of living increases, an SSI grant is 96%
more today than it was in 1989. At the same time, resource limits have
not been increased since 1989, from $2,000 for an individual and
$3,000 for a couple. If they had been increased to reflect the cost of
living, people would be allowed to own resources worth $4,000 for
individuals and $6,000 for couples, avoiding some marriage penalties.
This is true for other programs as well. It is common for TANF
programs to have $1,000-$3,000 asset limits that have not been
increased in many years. 220 Were these asset limits increased, some of
the marriage penalties would disappear. Some are advocating for asset
limits to be eliminated entirely, seeing them as an outdated way to
ensure that the rich are not getting welfare benefits. Eliminating these
asset limit restrictions would give people incentives to accumulate
resources to get out of poverty. 22 1 Increasing asset limits or eliminating
them entirely would go a long way toward reducing marriage
penalties.
D. Do Away with Automatic MarriagePenalties
There are some programs where marriage itself automatically
prevents a person from keeping their welfare benefits. A program
discussed above is the disabled adult child benefit for Social Security,
where people who receive benefits because their disabilities impaired
them while they were still dependents of their parents lose those
benefits on marriage, in many cases even if their spouse is
unemployed.222 These penalties do not consider whether beneficiaries
are at all better off when marrying, and could be eliminated or
more factors in determining whether people should
tempered by using
223
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remain
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receiving Social Security benefits, but there are many more situations than this.

E. Delay Deeming ofIncome and Resources when People Marry,
PerhapsEven Giving MarriageIncentives
This is also not a new idea. As discussed above in Moffitt's survey
of TANF regulations, eight states have some type of marriage
exception to income and resource rules.224 Some of these exceptions
include Oklahoma's earned income disregard for stepfathers. Five
states disregarding income of a new spouse temporarily, including
Idaho deeming only half of a stepfather's income, Alabama giving
new spouses easier earned income disregards, and Wyoming raising
the earned income disregard if married and allowing for a second
car. 225 In these cases, at least the immediate effect of marriage is not
economic damage. In some cases, marriage may even be a bonus, as
spouses get benefits that cohabitants may not.
F. Give MarriageBonuses or Tax Credits
If the government truly wants to encourage marriage in its policy,
it could give true incentives for people to marry. The government does
this for many things. There are incentives to buy a home in the form of
a tax deduction because the government wants people to own
property.226 There are incentives for people to buy hybrid cars to
protect the government's interest in the environment. 227 If the
government wants people to many, it could create an extra deduction
for married couples that is more than twice that which single people
receive. Alternatively, just as the EITC program encourages poor
people to work, a marriage credit program could encourage people
who work to marry, by either increasing the EITC credit or just giving
credit for the marriage itself, unrelated to an individual's employment
status.
CONCLUSION

The United States does not always enact laws that are consistent
with its stated policies; the area of marriage promotion is no exception
to this observation. Large amounts of resources (political, financial,
and intellectual) have been expended in the consideration of the value
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of promotion of marriage. It may be more productive to consider ways
in which existing welfare policy actually discourages marriage among
the poor and take steps to remove those disincentives.

